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010   $a9786613826251
010   $a9781462380077
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010   $a9781452771335
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010   $a9781283513807
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035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11580565
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943003
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10974940
035   $a(PQKB)11428545
035   $a(OCoLC)694141224
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014522
035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2006128
035   $a(IMF)WPIEA2006128
035   $aWPIEA2006128
035   $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443616
100   $a20020129d2006      uf         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aOutcomes-Based Conditionality : $eIts Role and Optimal Design /$fAnna Ivanova
205   $a1st ed.
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006.
215   $a1 online resource (25 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $a"May 2006."
311 08$a9781451863888 
311 08$a1451863888 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE MODEL""; ""III. OBSERVABLE CASE""; ""IV. UNOBSERVABLE CASE""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
330 3 $aThe paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/128
606   $aConditionality (International relations)
606   $aInternational finance
606   $aAsymmetric and Private Information$2imf
606   $aBanks and Banking$2imf
606   $aBanks$2imf
606   $aDepository Institutions$2imf
606   $aFinance$2imf
606   $aIndustries: Financial Services$2imf
606   $aInterest rates$2imf
606   $aInterest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects$2imf
606   $aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions$2imf
606   $aLoans$2imf
606   $aMarket interest rates$2imf
606   $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf
606   $aMortgages$2imf
606   $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf
606   $aTax incentives$2imf
606   $aTaxation$2imf
606   $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf
615  0$aConditionality (International relations)
615  0$aInternational finance.
615  7$aAsymmetric and Private Information
615  7$aBanks and Banking
615  7$aBanks
615  7$aDepository Institutions
615  7$aFinance
615  7$aIndustries: Financial Services
615  7$aInterest rates
615  7$aInterest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
615  7$aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
615  7$aLoans
615  7$aMarket interest rates
615  7$aMicro Finance Institutions
615  7$aMortgages
615  7$aPublic finance & taxation
615  7$aTax incentives
615  7$aTaxation
615  7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
700   $aIvanova$b Anna$01815945
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910975149703321
996   $aOutcomes-Based Conditionality$94371578
997   $aUNINA