LEADER 03703nam  22006974a 450 
001 9910973660603321
005 20251116214809.0
010   $a1-282-09765-2
010   $a9786612097652
010   $a0-262-27073-0
010   $a1-4294-7725-3
035   $a(CKB)1000000000461561
035   $a(EBL)3338569
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000136619
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11151402
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000136619
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10084328
035   $a(PQKB)11756169
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3338569
035   $a(BIP)46850671
035   $a(BIP)13039222
035   $a(EXLCZ)991000000000461561
100   $a20051101d2006      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 00$aDemocratic constitutional design and public policy $eanalysis and evidence /$fedited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg
205   $a1st ed.
210   $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dc2006
215   $a1 online resource (384 p.)
300   $aPapers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies.
311 08$a0-262-03349-6 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aIntroduction : Rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg -- Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer -- Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini -- Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann -- The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo -- On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton -- Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain -- Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller -- Common tax pool problems in federal systems / Brian Knight -- Judicial independence and economic development / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt -- Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney -- Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bjrn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton -- Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast.
330   $aLeading scholars in rational choice analysis present the public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives on the political and economic effects of constitutional design and review the accumulating empirical evidence.
606   $aComparative government$vCongresses
606   $aPolitical science$xDecision making$vCongresses
606   $aRational choice theory$vCongresses
606   $aPolitical planning$vCongresses
606   $aPolicy sciences$vCongresses
606   $aEconomic policy$vCongresses
606   $aConstitutional law
615  0$aComparative government
615  0$aPolitical science$xDecision making
615  0$aRational choice theory
615  0$aPolitical planning
615  0$aPolicy sciences
615  0$aEconomic policy
615  0$aConstitutional law.
676   $a320.6
701   $aCongleton$b Roger D$0141584
701   $aSwedenborg$b Birgitta$f1941-$0145545
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910973660603321
996   $aDemocratic constitutional design and public policy$94475838
997   $aUNINA