LEADER 05637oam 22013574 450 001 9910973350703321 005 20250426110435.0 010 $a9786613821782 010 $a9781462397228 010 $a1462397220 010 $a9781451993394 010 $a1451993390 010 $a9781282474253 010 $a1282474251 010 $a9781452702414 010 $a1452702411 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443216 035 $a(EBL)3014487 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940715 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11571962 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940715 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10956074 035 $a(PQKB)11782171 035 $a(OCoLC)694141168 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006146 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014487 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2006146 035 $aWPIEA2006146 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443216 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhat Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : $eAn Analysis of Rent Capture /$fElisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (35 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"June 2006." 311 08$a9781451864069 311 08$a145186406X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aThis paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/146 606 $aCorruption$zDeveloping countries$xPrevention$xEconometric models 606 $aRent (Economic theory)$xEconometric models 606 $aTransparency (Ethics) in government$xEconometric models 606 $aAdministrative Processes in Public Organizations$2imf 606 $aAggregate Human Capital$2imf 606 $aAggregate Labor Productivity$2imf 606 $aBureaucracy$2imf 606 $aCivil service & public sector$2imf 606 $aCivil service$2imf 606 $aCorporate crime$2imf 606 $aCorruption$2imf 606 $aCriminology$2imf 606 $aDemographic Economics: General$2imf 606 $aDemography$2imf 606 $aEmployment$2imf 606 $aIncome economics$2imf 606 $aIntergenerational Income Distribution$2imf 606 $aLabor$2imf 606 $aLabour$2imf 606 $aPopulation & demography$2imf 606 $aPopulation and demographics$2imf 606 $aPopulation$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aTax incentives$2imf 606 $aTaxation$2imf 606 $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf 606 $aUnemployment$2imf 606 $aWages$2imf 606 $aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General$2imf 606 $aWhite-collar crime$2imf 607 $aBolivia$2imf 615 0$aCorruption$xPrevention$xEconometric models. 615 0$aRent (Economic theory)$xEconometric models. 615 0$aTransparency (Ethics) in government$xEconometric models. 615 7$aAdministrative Processes in Public Organizations 615 7$aAggregate Human Capital 615 7$aAggregate Labor Productivity 615 7$aBureaucracy 615 7$aCivil service & public sector 615 7$aCivil service 615 7$aCorporate crime 615 7$aCorruption 615 7$aCriminology 615 7$aDemographic Economics: General 615 7$aDemography 615 7$aEmployment 615 7$aIncome economics 615 7$aIntergenerational Income Distribution 615 7$aLabor 615 7$aLabour 615 7$aPopulation & demography 615 7$aPopulation and demographics 615 7$aPopulation 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aTax incentives 615 7$aTaxation 615 7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General 615 7$aUnemployment 615 7$aWages 615 7$aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General 615 7$aWhite-collar crime 700 $aPaul$b Elisabeth$0907258 701 $aDabla-Norris$b Era$01815724 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bMiddle East and Central Asia Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910973350703321 996 $aWhat Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail$94371358 997 $aUNINA LEADER 01298oam 2200421zu 450 001 9911006768803321 005 20210807001257.0 010 $a1-61583-448-6 035 $a(CKB)2590000000000219 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000403921 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12156402 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000403921 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10436302 035 $a(PQKB)10428713 035 $a(EXLCZ)992590000000000219 100 $a20160829d2010 uy 101 0 $aeng 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMaterial Biodegradation and Biostabilization 210 31$a[Place of publication not identified]$cChemTec Publishing$d2010 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-895198-44-5 606 $aChemical & Materials Engineering$2HILCC 606 $aEngineering & Applied Sciences$2HILCC 606 $aMaterials Science$2HILCC 615 7$aChemical & Materials Engineering 615 7$aEngineering & Applied Sciences 615 7$aMaterials Science 700 $aWypych$b George$019294 702 $aFalkiewicz-Dulik$b Michalina 702 $aJanda$b K 801 0$bPQKB 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9911006768803321 996 $aMaterial Biodegradation and Biostabilization$94389950 997 $aUNINA