LEADER 05070oam 22012374 450 001 9910972477103321 005 20250426110814.0 010 $a9786613828378 010 $a9781462338696 010 $a1462338690 010 $a9781452756189 010 $a145275618X 010 $a9781283515924 010 $a128351592X 010 $a9781451909647 010 $a1451909640 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443764 035 $a(EBL)3014436 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940055 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11553617 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940055 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10938243 035 $a(PQKB)10598402 035 $a(OCoLC)694141085 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006251 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014436 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2006251 035 $aWPIEA2006251 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443764 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAre the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek? /$fMarcello Estevão, Filipa Sa 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (26 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"November 2006." 311 08$a9781451865110 311 08$a1451865112 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 24). 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH""; ""III. CONSEQUENCES OF HOURS RESTRICTIONS: THEORY""; ""IV. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY""; ""V. RESULTS""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aLegally mandated reductions in the workweek can be either a constraint on individuals' choice or a tool to coordinate individuals' preferences for lower work hours. We confront these two hypotheses by studying the consequences of the workweek reduction in France from 39 to 35 hours, which was first applied to large firms in 2000. Using the timing difference by firm size to set up a quasi-experiment and data from the French labor force survey, we show that the law constrained the choice of a significant number of individuals: dual-job holdings increased, some workers in large firms went to small firms where hours were not constrained, and others were replaced by cheaper, unemployed individuals as relative hourly wages increased in large firms. Employment of persons directly affected by the law declined, although the net effect on aggregate employment was not significant. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/251 606 $aHours of labor$zFrance$xEconometric models 606 $aWorkweek$zFrance$xEconometric models 606 $aAggregate Factor Income Distribution$2imf 606 $aAggregate Human Capital$2imf 606 $aAggregate Labor Productivity$2imf 606 $aEconomic theory$2imf 606 $aEmployment$2imf 606 $aIncome economics$2imf 606 $aIncome$2imf 606 $aIntergenerational Income Distribution$2imf 606 $aLabor economics$2imf 606 $aLabor Economics: General$2imf 606 $aLabor$2imf 606 $aLabour$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aNational accounts$2imf 606 $aSingle Equation Models$2imf 606 $aSingle Variables: Cross-Sectional Models$2imf 606 $aSpatial Models$2imf 606 $aTime Allocation and Labor Supply$2imf 606 $aTreatment Effect Models$2imf 606 $aUnemployment$2imf 606 $aUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search$2imf 606 $aWages$2imf 606 $aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General$2imf 607 $aFrance$2imf 615 0$aHours of labor$xEconometric models. 615 0$aWorkweek$xEconometric models. 615 7$aAggregate Factor Income Distribution 615 7$aAggregate Human Capital 615 7$aAggregate Labor Productivity 615 7$aEconomic theory 615 7$aEmployment 615 7$aIncome economics 615 7$aIncome 615 7$aIntergenerational Income Distribution 615 7$aLabor economics 615 7$aLabor Economics: General 615 7$aLabor 615 7$aLabour 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aNational accounts 615 7$aSingle Equation Models 615 7$aSingle Variables: Cross-Sectional Models 615 7$aSpatial Models 615 7$aTime Allocation and Labor Supply 615 7$aTreatment Effect Models 615 7$aUnemployment 615 7$aUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search 615 7$aWages 615 7$aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General 700 $aEstevão$b Marcello$01815803 701 $aSa$b Filipa$01815804 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bWestern Hemisphere Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910972477103321 996 $aAre the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek$94371327 997 $aUNINA