LEADER 01122nam0-22004331i-450- 001 990000031360403321 005 20140926121933.0 035 $a000003136 035 $aFED01000003136 035 $a(Aleph)000003136FED01 035 $a000003136 100 $a20110202d1959----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aeng 102 $aUS 105 $ay-------001yy 200 1 $aPlastic analysis of structures$fPhilip G. Hodge 210 $aNew York$cMcGraw-Hill$d1959 215 $aXIV, 364 p.$cill.$d24 cm 610 0 $aStrutture 610 0 $aDinamica 610 0 $aStress Waves. 610 0 $aVibrazioni 610 0 $aMeccanica 610 0 $aTeoria della plasticità 676 $a624.17 700 1$aHodge,$bPhilip Gibson$02364 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990000031360403321 952 $a13 D 24 04$b23437$fFINBC 952 $a07 G-52$fDINSC 952 $a03 TP.0,22$b646$fIINTC 952 $a07 A-56$fDINSC 959 $aFINBC 959 $aDINSC 959 $aIINTC 959 $aDINSC 996 $aPlastic analysis of structures$9105650 997 $aUNINA LEADER 04770nam 2200697 a 450 001 9910972104203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9781782840756 010 $a1782840753 010 $a9781782840732 010 $a1782840737 024 7 $a10.3828/9781845195779 035 $a(CKB)2550000001134165 035 $a(OCoLC)849918621 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10714388 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000918450 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11485432 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000918450 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10908412 035 $a(PQKB)10270107 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1190290 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10714388 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL533874 035 $a(OCoLC)845256897 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1190290 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001134165 100 $a20121214d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe Nixon Administration and the Middle East peace process, 1969-1973 $efrom the Rogers Plan to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War /$fBoaz Vanetik, Zaki Shalom ; translated from Hebrew by Guy Solomon 210 $aBrighton $cSussex Academic Press$d2013 215 $a1 online resource (309 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a9781845195779 311 08$a1845195779 311 08$a9781306026239 311 08$a1306026237 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aPart 1. The twilight of the Nasser Regime: 1967-1970 -- The Middle East arena following the Six Day War -- The Johnson Administration's attempts to promote a settlement between Israel and Egypt in 1968 -- The "two-power talks" (US-USSR): March-September 1969 -- The First Rogers Plan, October-December 1969 -- The Rogers initiative for a ceasefire in the Suez Canal, June 1970, part 1 -- The Rogers initiative for a ceasefire in the Suez Canal, June 1970, part 2 -- The crisis in Jordan (September 1970) and its implications -- Part 2. "The stalemate policy": 1971-1972 -- Sadat replaces Nasser, Cairo and Washington begin moving closer -- Attempts to arrange an interim agreement in the Suez Canal: February 1971 -- Ongoing efforts to reach an interim Israeli-Egyptian agreement -- The unofficial death of the Rogers Plan -- Part 3. The run up to the Yom Kippur War: Autumn 1972-October 1973 -- Reinforcing the status quo in the region -- Complacency in the shadow of continued diplomatic stalemate -- Summary and conclusions. 330 $aThe Yom Kippur War was a watershed moment in Israeli society and a national trauma whose wounds have yet to heal some four decades later. In the years following the war many studies addressed the internal and international political background prior to the war, attempting to determine causes and steps by political players and parties in Israel, Egypt and the United States. But to date there has been no comprehensive study based on archival materials and other primary sources. Classified documents from that period have recently become available and it is now possible to examine in depth a crucial period in Middle East history generally and Israeli history in particular. The authors provide a penetrating and insightful viewpoint on the question that lies at the heart of the Israeli polity and military: Was an opportunity missed to prevent the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War? The book provides surprising answers to long-standing issues: How did National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, succeed in torpedoing the efforts of the State Department to bring about an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1971?; Would that agreement have allowed Israel to hold on to most of the Sinai Peninsula for many years and at the same time avert the outbreak of the war; Did Golda Meir reject any diplomatic initiative that came up for discussion in the years preceding the war?; Was the White House's Middle East policy throughout 1973 a catalyst for war breaking out? 606 $aIsrael-Arab War, 1973$xCauses 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zIsrael 607 $aIsrael$xForeign relations$zUnited States 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zEgypt 607 $aEgypt$xForeign relations$zUnited States 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1969-1974 615 0$aIsrael-Arab War, 1973$xCauses. 676 $a956.04 700 $aVanetik$b Boaz$01792389 701 $aShalom$b Zaki$0478756 701 $aSolomon$b Guy$01792390 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910972104203321 996 $aThe Nixon Administration and the Middle East peace process, 1969-1973$94330835 997 $aUNINA