LEADER 05189nam 2200745Ia 450 001 9910971866803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9786612537615 010 $a9781282537613 010 $a128253761X 010 $a9780226742410 010 $a0226742415 024 7 $a10.7208/9780226742410 035 $a(CKB)2550000000007445 035 $a(EBL)485957 035 $a(OCoLC)593240134 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000339852 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11266885 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000339852 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10365165 035 $a(PQKB)11298039 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC485957 035 $a(DE-B1597)535742 035 $a(OCoLC)1135587054 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780226742410 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL485957 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10366802 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL253761 035 $a(Perlego)1975065 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000007445 100 $a19900103d1990 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 04$aThe limits of rationality /$fedited by Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aChicago $cUniversity of Chicago Press$d1990 215 $a1 online resource (ix, 426 pages) $cillustrations 311 0 $a9780226742380 311 0 $a0226742385 311 0 $a9780226742397 311 0 $a0226742393 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter --$tCONTENTS --$tAcknowledgments --$tIntroduction: The Limits of Rationality --$t1 When Rationality Fails --$tComment: What Might Rationality Fail to Do? --$t2 Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions --$t3 Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved --$tComment: Should a Rational Agent Maximize Expected Utility? --$t4 Rational Choice in Experimental Markets --$tComment: Individual Decision Making versus Market-Level Predictions: The Applicability of Rational Choice Theory --$t5 De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum --$tComment: De Gustibus Non Est Explanandum --$t6 Cooperation and Rationality: Notes on the Collective Action Problem and Its Solutions --$tComment: On the Inadequacy of Game Theory for the Solution of Real-World Collective Action Problems --$t7 Norm-Generating Structures --$tComment: An Alternative Approach to the Generation and Maintenance of Norms --$t8 Reason and Rationality --$tComment: Stinchcombe's "Reason and Rationality" --$t9 Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies --$tComment: Applying Rational Choice Theory: The Role of Leadership in Team Production --$t10 The Social Evolution of Cooperation --$tComment: On Russell Hardin's "The Social Evolution of Cooperation" --$t11 Institutions and Their Consequences for Economic Performance --$t12 A Logic of Institutional Change --$tList of Contributors --$tIndex 330 $aPrevailing economic theory presumes that agents act rationally when they make decisions, striving to maximize the efficient use of their resources. Psychology has repeatedly challenged the rational choice paradigm with persuasive evidence that people do not always make the optimal choice. Yet the paradigm has proven so successful a predictor that its use continues to flourish, fueled by debate across the social sciences over why it works so well. Intended to introduce novices to rational choice theory, this accessible, interdisciplinary book collects writings by leading researchers. The Limits of Rationality illuminates the rational choice paradigm of social and political behavior itself, identifies its limitations, clarifies the nature of current controversies, and offers suggestions for improving current models. In the first section of the book, contributors consider the theoretical foundations of rational choice. Models of rational choice play an important role in providing a standard of human action and the bases for constitutional design, but do they also succeed as explanatory models of behavior? Do empirical failures of these explanatory models constitute a telling condemnation of rational choice theory or do they open new avenues of investigation and theorizing? Emphasizing analyses of norms and institutions, the second and third sections of the book investigate areas in which rational choice theory might be extended in order to provide better models. The contributors evaluate the adequacy of analyses based on neoclassical economics, the potential contributions of game theory and cognitive science, and the consequences for the basic framework when unequal bargaining power and hierarchy are introduced. 606 $aSocial change 606 $aSocial choice 606 $aDecision making 606 $aReasoning 615 0$aSocial change. 615 0$aSocial choice. 615 0$aDecision making. 615 0$aReasoning. 676 $a303.4 701 $aCook$b Karen S$0124739 701 $aLevi$b Margaret$0124740 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910971866803321 996 $aThe limits of rationality$94359886 997 $aUNINA