LEADER 03829nam 22005535 450 001 9910971119503321 005 20250806170656.0 010 $a1-4612-4316-5 024 7 $a10.1007/978-1-4612-4316-8 035 $a(CKB)3400000000090798 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000806840 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11458565 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000806840 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10754895 035 $a(PQKB)10140524 035 $a(DE-He213)978-1-4612-4316-8 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3075334 035 $a(PPN)238069524 035 $a(EXLCZ)993400000000090798 100 $a20121227d1994 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn|008mamaa 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aIntroduction to Game Theory /$fby Peter Morris 205 $a1st ed. 1994. 210 1$aNew York, NY :$cSpringer New York :$cImprint: Springer,$d1994. 215 $a1 online resource (XXVI, 252 p.) 225 1 $aUniversitext,$x2191-6675 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a0-387-94284-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a1. Games in Extensive Form -- 1.1. Trees -- 1.2. Game Trees -- 1.3. Choice Functions and Strategies -- 1.4. Games with Chance Moves -- 1.5. Equilibrium N-tuples of Strategies -- 1.6. Normal Forms -- 2. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games -- 2.1. Saddle Points -- 2.2. Mixed Strategies -- 2.3. Small Games -- 2.4. Symmetric Games -- 3. Linear Programming -- 3.1. Primal and Dual Problems -- 3.2. Basic Forms and Pivots -- 3.3. The Simplex Algorithm -- 3.4. Avoiding Cycles and Achieving Feasibility -- 3.5. Duality -- 4. Solving Matrix Games -- 4.1. The Minimax Theorem -- 4.2. Some Examples -- 5. Non-Zero-Sum Games -- 5.1. Noncooperative Games -- 5.2. Solution Concepts for Noncooperative Games -- 5.3. Cooperative Games -- 6. N-Person Cooperative Games -- 6.1. Coalitions -- 6.2. Imputations -- 6.3. Strategic Equivalence -- 6.4. Two Solution Concepts -- 7. Game-Playing Programs -- 7.1. Three Algorithms -- 7.2. Evaluation Functions -- Appendix. Solutions. 330 $aThe mathematical theory of games has as its purpose the analysis of a wide range of competitive situations. These include most of the recreations which people usually call "games" such as chess, poker, bridge, backgam­ mon, baseball, and so forth, but also contests between companies, military forces, and nations. For the purposes of developing the theory, all these competitive situations are called games. The analysis of games has two goals. First, there is the descriptive goal of understanding why the parties ("players") in competitive situations behave as they do. The second is the more practical goal of being able to advise the players of the game as to the best way to play. The first goal is especially relevant when the game is on a large scale, has many players, and has complicated rules. The economy and international politics are good examples. In the ideal, the pursuit of the second goal would allow us to describe to each player a strategy which guarantees that he or she does as well as possible. As we shall see, this goal is too ambitious. In many games, the phrase "as well as possible" is hard to define. In other games, it can be defined and there is a clear-cut "solution" (that is, best way of playing). 410 0$aUniversitext,$x2191-6675 606 $aDiscrete mathematics 606 $aDiscrete Mathematics 615 0$aDiscrete mathematics. 615 14$aDiscrete Mathematics. 676 $a519.3 700 $aMorris$b Peter$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0344223 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910971119503321 996 $aIntroduction to game theory$9375871 997 $aUNINA