LEADER 07377oam 22013094 450 001 9910970776403321 005 20251116163622.0 010 $a9786612843556 010 $a9781462390076 010 $a1462390072 010 $a9781452722825 010 $a145272282X 010 $a9781451872880 010 $a1451872887 010 $a9781282843554 010 $a1282843559 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055290 035 $a(EBL)1608346 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940063 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11519260 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940063 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10946362 035 $a(PQKB)10314048 035 $a(OCoLC)712987789 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009141 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608346 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2009141 035 $aWPIEA2009141 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055290 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBanking Crises and Crisis Dating : $eTheory and Evidence /$fElena Loukoianova, Gianni De Nicolo, John Boyd 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (52 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"July 2009." 311 08$a9781451917178 311 08$a1451917171 327 $aContents; I. Introduction and Summary; II. Major Classifications of Banking Crises; III. BC Indicators an d Their Discrepancies; IV. A Simple Banking Model; V. Evidence from Cross-Country Data: Benchmark Specifications; A. Logit Regressions with BC Indicators as Dependent Variables; B. SBS indicators Predict BC indicators; C. Logit Regressions with SBS Indicators as Dependent Variables; VI. Market Structure and Deposit Insurance; A. Bank Market Structure and Competition; B. Deposit Insurance; VII. Currency and "Twin" Crises; A. BC and SBS Indicators as Dependent Variables 327 $aB. Currency Crises as Dependent VariablesVIII. Evidence from Bank-Level Data; A. Measures of Systemic Bank Shocks; B. SBS indicators Predict BC indicators; C. Market Structure, Deposit Insurance and External Shocks; VI. Conclusion; References; Tables; 1. BC Indicators; 2. Logit Regressions with Start Date BC Indicators (crisis dates after the first crisis year excluded); 3. Logit Regressions with BC Indicators (all observations with crisis dating); 4. Logit Regressions: Do SBS Lending Indicators Predict BC Indicators?; 5. Logit Regressions: Do SBS Deposit Indicators Predict BC Indicators? 327 $a6. Logit Regressions with SBS Indicators ad Dependent Variables7. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators and Bank Concentration Measures; 8. Logit Regressions: SBS Indicators and Bank Concentration Measures; 9. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, SBS Indicators and Deposit Insurance; 10. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, SBS Indicators, Deposit Insurance Features and Quality of Institutions; 11. Logit Regressions: BC Indicators, Currency and Twin Crises; 12. Logit Regressions: SBS Indicators, Currency and Twin Crises; 13. Logit Regressions: Currency Crises and SBS Indicators 327 $a14. Bank Level Data, Random Effect Logit Regressions: SBS Indicators Predict BC Indicators15. Bank Level Data, Random Effect Logit Regressions: Determinants of SBS and BC Indicators; A1. ""Systemic"" Banking Crises and Crisis Dating in Different Classifications 330 3 $aMany empirical studies of banking crises have employed "banking crisis" (BC) indicators constructedusing primarily information on government actions undertaken in response to bank distress. Weformulate a simple theoretical model of a banking industry which we use to identify and constructtheory-based measures of systemic bank shocks (SBS). Using both country-level and firm-level samples, we show that SBS indicators consistently predict BC indicators based on four major BCseries that have appeared in the literature. Therefore, BC indicatorsactually measure lagged government responses to systemic bank shocks, rather than the occurrence of crises per se. We re-examine the separate impact of macroeconomic factors, bank market structure, deposit insurance, andexternal shocks on the probability of a systemic bank shocks and on the probability of governmentresponses to bank distress. The impact of these variables on the likelihood of a government responseto bank distress is totally different from that on the likelihood of a systemic bank shock.Disentangling the effects of systemic bank shocks and government responses turns out to be crucial inunderstanding the roots of bank fragility. Many findings of a large empirical literature need to be re-assessed and/or re-interpreted. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/141 606 $aBank failures$xEconometric models 606 $aBanks and banking$xEconometric models 606 $aEconomic indicators 606 $aBank credit$2imf 606 $aBanking crises$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aCredit$2imf 606 $aCrisis management$2imf 606 $aCurrency crises$2imf 606 $aDeposit insurance$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aForeign Exchange$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMonetary economics$2imf 606 $aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General$2imf 606 $aMoney and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 607 $aUnited States$2imf 615 0$aBank failures$xEconometric models. 615 0$aBanks and banking$xEconometric models. 615 0$aEconomic indicators. 615 7$aBank credit 615 7$aBanking crises 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aCredit 615 7$aCrisis management 615 7$aCurrency crises 615 7$aDeposit insurance 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aForeign Exchange 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMonetary economics 615 7$aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General 615 7$aMoney and Monetary Policy 615 7$aMortgages 676 $a332 700 $aLoukoianova$b Elena$01816361 701 $aBoyd$b John$0341064 701 $aDe Nicolo$b Gianni$0375199 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bResearch Department. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910970776403321 996 $aBanking Crises and Crisis Dating$94372580 997 $aUNINA