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010   $a9786613821508
010   $a9781462301362
010   $a1462301363
010   $a9781452758206
010   $a1452758204
010   $a9781282448315
010   $a1282448315
010   $a9781451909739
010   $a145190973X
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035   $a(EBL)3014417
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000943011
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11492230
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943011
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10974941
035   $a(PQKB)10265061
035   $a(OCoLC)698585716
035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2006260
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014417
035   $a(IMF)WPIEA2006260
035   $aWPIEA2006260
035   $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443188
100   $a20020129d2006      uf         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aPolitical Price Cycles in Regulated Industries : $eTheory and Evidence /$fClaudio Paiva, Rodrigo Moita
205   $a1st ed.
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006.
215   $a1 online resource (24 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $a"November 2006."
311 08$a9781451865202 
311 08$a1451865201 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. BACKGROUND""; ""III. A MODEL OF A POLITICAL PRICE CYCLES IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY""; ""IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE""; ""V. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""Appendix 1. List of Countries Included in the Empirical Work""; ""REFERENCES""
330 3 $aThis paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry may fall in periods immediately preceding an election. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical model. Using quarterly data from 32 industrial and developing countries over 1978-2004, we find strong statistical and econometric evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in gasoline markets.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/260
606   $aPrices$xGovernment policy
606   $aPrice regulation
606   $aBusiness cycles$2imf
606   $aDeflation$2imf
606   $aEconomic growth$2imf
606   $aEnergy: Demand and Supply$2imf
606   $aEnergy: General$2imf
606   $aFuel prices$2imf
606   $aGas industry$2imf
606   $aGasoline$2imf
606   $aInflation$2imf
606   $aInvestment & securities$2imf
606   $aInvestments: Energy$2imf
606   $aMacroeconomics$2imf
606   $aOil prices$2imf
606   $aPrice Level$2imf
606   $aPrices$2imf
606   $aPrices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf
607   $aUnited States$2imf
615  0$aPrices$xGovernment policy.
615  0$aPrice regulation.
615  7$aBusiness cycles
615  7$aDeflation
615  7$aEconomic growth
615  7$aEnergy: Demand and Supply
615  7$aEnergy: General
615  7$aFuel prices
615  7$aGas industry
615  7$aGasoline
615  7$aInflation
615  7$aInvestment & securities
615  7$aInvestments: Energy
615  7$aMacroeconomics
615  7$aOil prices
615  7$aPrice Level
615  7$aPrices
615  7$aPrices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)
700   $aPaiva$b Claudio$01816356
701   $aMoita$b Rodrigo$01816357
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910970500103321
996   $aPolitical Price Cycles in Regulated Industries$94372386
997   $aUNINA