LEADER 04710oam 22011414 450 001 9910970497403321 005 20250426110559.0 010 $a9786613820556 010 $a9781462390168 010 $a1462390161 010 $a9781451986334 010 $a1451986335 010 $a9781282392120 010 $a1282392123 010 $a9781451909135 010 $a1451909136 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443095 035 $a(EBL)3014538 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940824 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11519299 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940824 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10955521 035 $a(PQKB)11225520 035 $a(OCoLC)694141243 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006119 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014538 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2006119 035 $aWPIEA2006119 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443095 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes : $eEvidence From the Caribbean /$fRupa Duttagupta, Guillermo Tolosa 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (37 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"May 2006." 311 08$a9781451863796 311 08$a1451863799 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. FIXED EXCHANGE RATES, CURRENCY UNIONS, AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE""; ""III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS""; ""IV. CONCLUSION""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aThis paper assesses the nature of fiscal discipline under alternative exchange rate regimes. First, it shows in a simple theoretical framework that fiscal agencies under a currency union with a fixed exchange rate can have the largest incentive to overspend or "free-ride" (compared to those under other exchange rate regimes) owing to their ability to spread the costs of overspending in terms of the inflation tax across both time-given the fixed exchange rate-and space-given the currency union. In contrast, such free-riding behavior does not arise under flexible regimes owing to the immediate inflationary impact of spending. Next, empirically, it shows that fiscal stances in countries with fixed pegs and currency unions regime demonstrate greater free-riding behavior than countries with more flexible regimes in 15 Caribbean countries during 1983-2004. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/119 606 $aFiscal policy$zCaribbean Area$xEconometric models 606 $aForeign exchange rates$zCaribbean Area$xEconometric models 606 $aComparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aConventional peg$2imf 606 $aCurrency$2imf 606 $aEconomic integration$2imf 606 $aExchange rate arrangements$2imf 606 $aExports and Imports$2imf 606 $aFinancial Aspects of Economic Integration$2imf 606 $aFiscal Policy$2imf 606 $aFiscal policy$2imf 606 $aFiscal stance$2imf 606 $aForeign Exchange$2imf 606 $aForeign exchange$2imf 606 $aInternational economics$2imf 606 $aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMonetary unions$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aStabilization$2imf 606 $aTreasury Policy$2imf 607 $aAntigua and Barbuda$2imf 615 0$aFiscal policy$xEconometric models. 615 0$aForeign exchange rates$xEconometric models. 615 7$aComparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy 615 7$aConventional peg 615 7$aCurrency 615 7$aEconomic integration 615 7$aExchange rate arrangements 615 7$aExports and Imports 615 7$aFinancial Aspects of Economic Integration 615 7$aFiscal Policy 615 7$aFiscal policy 615 7$aFiscal stance 615 7$aForeign Exchange 615 7$aForeign exchange 615 7$aInternational economics 615 7$aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMonetary unions 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aStabilization 615 7$aTreasury Policy 700 $aDuttagupta$b Rupa$01815725 701 $aTolosa$b Guillermo$01816350 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bWestern Hemisphere Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910970497403321 996 $aFiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes$94372371 997 $aUNINA