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010   $a9786613821232
010   $a9781462346783
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010   $a9781282448049
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035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943042
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035   $a(PQKB)10924103
035   $a(OCoLC)698585523
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014331
035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2006108
035   $a(IMF)WPIEA2006108
035   $aWPIEA2006108
035   $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443162
100   $a20020129d2006      uf         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aReforming Employment Protection Legislation in France /$fJianping Zhou
205   $a1st ed.
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006.
215   $a1 online resource (29 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $a"April 2006."
311 08$a9781451863680 
311 08$a1451863683 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION (EPL) IN FRANCE""; ""III. LITERATURE REVIEW""; ""IV. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK""; ""V. SIMULATION RESULTS""; ""VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES""
330 3 $aOver the last 15 years, the reforms of employment protection legislation (EPL) in European countries have mainly eased hiring and firing restrictions for temporary employment while leaving the strict EPL provisions for regular or permanent contracts unchanged. Recent reforms in France follow this pattern. Using a search-matching model, we argue that this type of partial reform is inefficient: easing restrictions on temporary jobs fosters both job creation and job destruction, but strict EPL discourages both. The overall impact on equilibrium unemployment is thus ambiguous, depending on the characteristics of the specific labor market. Simulations of the model, calibrated for the French labor market, suggest that the job destruction effect is stronger, thus raising the unemployment rate.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/108
606   $aLabor laws and legislation$zFrance$xEconometric models
606   $aIndustrial laws and legislation$zFrance
606   $aDemand and Supply of Labor: General$2imf
606   $aEmployment protection$2imf
606   $aIncome economics$2imf
606   $aJob creation$2imf
606   $aLabor Contracts$2imf
606   $aLabor Demand$2imf
606   $aLabor market$2imf
606   $aLabor markets$2imf
606   $aLabor$2imf
606   $aLabour$2imf
606   $aManpower policy$2imf
606   $aUnemployment rate$2imf
606   $aUnemployment$2imf
606   $aUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search$2imf
607   $aFrance$2imf
615  0$aLabor laws and legislation$xEconometric models.
615  0$aIndustrial laws and legislation
615  7$aDemand and Supply of Labor: General
615  7$aEmployment protection
615  7$aIncome economics
615  7$aJob creation
615  7$aLabor Contracts
615  7$aLabor Demand
615  7$aLabor market
615  7$aLabor markets
615  7$aLabor
615  7$aLabour
615  7$aManpower policy
615  7$aUnemployment rate
615  7$aUnemployment
615  7$aUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
700   $aZhou$b Jianping$01804346
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bEuropean Dept.
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910969923103321
996   $aReforming Employment Protection Legislation in France$94372504
997   $aUNINA