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100   $a20130709d2008      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcn|||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aBody, mind and self in Hume's critical realism /$fFred Wilson
210   $aFrankfurt $cOntos Verlag$d2008
215   $a1 online resource (553 p.)
225 1 $aPhilosophische Analyse / Philosophical analysis ;$vBd. 22
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311 08$a3-11-032668-X 
311 08$a1-299-72512-0 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $t Frontmatter -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tNote -- $tTable of Contents -- $tIntroduction -- $tEndnotes to Introduction -- $tChapter One: Self as Substance -- $tChapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- $tChapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- $tChapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- $tChapter Five: Hume's Positive Account of the Self -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex of Names -- $t Backmatter
330   $aThis essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of
410  0$aPhilosophische Analyse ;$vBd. 22.
606   $aMind and body
606   $aSelf
615  0$aMind and body.
615  0$aSelf.
676   $a190
700   $aWilson$b Fred$01100427
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910969408103321
996   $aBody, mind and self in Hume's critical realism$94446695
997   $aUNINA