LEADER 04087nam 22008534a 450 001 9910969238303321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9786612129728 010 $a9781282129726 010 $a1282129724 010 $a9781400827725 010 $a1400827728 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400827725 035 $a(CKB)1000000000756334 035 $a(EBL)445544 035 $a(OCoLC)341998758 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000490242 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12203921 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000490242 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10467388 035 $a(PQKB)10398454 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000233599 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11202640 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000233599 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10233562 035 $a(PQKB)11683953 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36326 035 $a(DE-B1597)446481 035 $a(OCoLC)979578585 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400827725 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL445544 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10284081 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL212972 035 $a(PPN)26513529X 035 $a(FR-PaCSA)88935373 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC445544 035 $a(Perlego)734474 035 $a(FRCYB88935373)88935373 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000756334 100 $a20060327d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aReasons without rationalism /$fKieran Setiya 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2007 215 $a1 online resource (143 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 08$a9780691146522 311 08$a0691146527 311 08$a9780691127491 311 08$a0691127492 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [121]-127) and index. 327 $a"Squeezing the good into the right through the tubes of imperfection" -- The relevance of action theory -- A puzzle about intention -- The belief-desire model -- Acting for reasons -- Solving the puzzle -- A causal theory of action? -- Against the guise of the good -- Character and practical thought -- An argument for the virtue theory -- Practical reason and the guise of the good -- Motivation and desire -- Self-knowledge as the aim of action. 330 $aModern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. 606 $aEthics 606 $aVirtue 606 $aAct (Philosophy) 606 $aPractical reason 615 0$aEthics. 615 0$aVirtue. 615 0$aAct (Philosophy) 615 0$aPractical reason. 676 $a171/.3 700 $aSetiya$b Kieran$f1976-$0835503 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910969238303321 996 $aReasons without rationalism$94341151 997 $aUNINA