LEADER 03277nam 22005774a 450 001 9910968866303321 005 20251117115554.0 010 $a1-59332-023-X 035 $a(CKB)111087028316812 035 $a(OCoLC)52778451 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10047966 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000137902 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11158928 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000137902 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10096241 035 $a(PQKB)11589730 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3016710 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3016710 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10047966 035 $a(OCoLC)697625596 035 $a(BIP)7967721 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111087028316812 100 $a20020925d2003 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe development dilemma $ethe political economy of intellectual property rights in the international system /$fRobert L. Ostergard, Jr 210 $aNew York $cLFB Scholarly Pub.$d2003 215 $a1 online resource (199 p.) 225 1 $aLaw and society 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a1-931202-47-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 171-183) and index. 327 $aIntro -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 A Clash of Interests: Development, Universal Human Rights, and Intellectual Property Rights -- 2 Policy Beyond Assumptions: Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth -- 3 What is best for the rest?: The Political and Economic Determinants of Intellectual Property Rights Protection -- 4 United States Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Policy in a Changing Global Environment -- 5 The Scramble for China -- 6 Life, Death and Intellectual Property: The South Africa-US Patent Dispute -- Conclusion -- Measurement Appendix -- Notes -- Data References -- References -- Index. 330 $a Ostergard argues that developing nations adopt stronger intellectual property rights protection in response to international pressures and not as a basis for economic growth and development. Using a new methodology for the measurement of intellectual property rights protection, Ostergard presents empirical evidence to show that, as developing nations become more integrated into the international economic system, they are faced with greater external pressures to increase intellectual property rights protection. Hence, their decision to adopt stronger intellectual property rights protection is purely political. This runs counter to Western arguments for intellectual property rights based on the assumption that stronger intellectual property rights promote economic growth and development. 410 0$aLaw and society (New York, N.Y.) 606 $aIntellectual property$xPolitical aspects$zDeveloping countries 606 $aIntellectual property (International law) 615 0$aIntellectual property$xPolitical aspects 615 0$aIntellectual property (International law) 676 $a341.7/58 700 $aOstergard$b Robert L$01869568 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910968866303321 996 $aThe development dilemma$94477759 997 $aUNINA