LEADER 04697oam 22010934 450 001 9910967322003321 005 20250426110710.0 010 $a9786613829641 010 $a9781462314478 010 $a1462314473 010 $a9781452770314 010 $a145277031X 010 $a9781283517195 010 $a1283517191 010 $a9781451909845 010 $a1451909845 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443890 035 $a(EBL)3014358 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000939935 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11523027 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000939935 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10946027 035 $a(PQKB)10545086 035 $a(OCoLC)712989252 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014358 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006271 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2006271 035 $aWPIEA2006271 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443890 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe Size Distribution of Firms, Cournot, and Optimal Taxation /$fMark Gersovitz 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (28 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"December 2006". 311 08$a9781451865318 311 08$a1451865317 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS IN AN UNTAXED ECONOMY""; ""III. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS AND THE SPECIFIC SALES TAX""; ""IV. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS AND THE AD VALOREM SALES TAX""; ""V. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS AND THE HYBRID PROFITS TAX""; ""VI. ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLISTS AND THE HYBRID PROFITS AND AD VALOREM TAXES""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aTax laws and administrations often treat different size firms differently. There is, however, little research on the consequences. As modeled here, oligopolists with different efficiencies determine the size distribution of firms. A government that maximizes a weighted sum of consumer surplus, profits, and tax receipts can tax firms with different efficiencies differently and provides a reference point for other, more restricted differential tax systems. Taxes include a specific sales tax, an ad valorem sales tax, and a profits tax with imperfect deductibility of capital cost, and a combination of the last two. In general there is a pattern of tax rates by efficiency of firm. It is heavily dependent on the social valuation of tax receipts. Analytic and simulation results are provided. When both ad valorem taxes and the imperfect profits tax are combined, simulations suggest that the former rate is higher and the latter rate is lower for relatively inefficient firms. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/271 606 $aTaxation 606 $aIndustrial organization (Economic theory) 606 $aCompetition$2imf 606 $aEfficiency$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf 606 $aIncome tax systems$2imf 606 $aIncome tax$2imf 606 $aLaw and legislation$2imf 606 $aOptimal Taxation$2imf 606 $aOptimal taxation$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aTax administration and procedure$2imf 606 $aTax administration core functions$2imf 606 $aTax Law$2imf 606 $aTax law$2imf 606 $aTaxation & duties law$2imf 606 $aTaxation$2imf 606 $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf 607 $aCameroon$2imf 615 0$aTaxation. 615 0$aIndustrial organization (Economic theory) 615 7$aCompetition 615 7$aEfficiency 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) 615 7$aIncome tax systems 615 7$aIncome tax 615 7$aLaw and legislation 615 7$aOptimal Taxation 615 7$aOptimal taxation 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aTax administration and procedure 615 7$aTax administration core functions 615 7$aTax Law 615 7$aTax law 615 7$aTaxation & duties law 615 7$aTaxation 615 7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General 700 $aGersovitz$b Mark$0128643 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910967322003321 996 $aThe Size Distribution of Firms, Cournot, and Optimal Taxation$94371319 997 $aUNINA