LEADER 03641nam 2200721Ia 450 001 9910966719403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9780791483787 010 $a0791483789 010 $a9781423743781 010 $a1423743784 035 $a(CKB)1000000000458767 035 $a(OCoLC)76786420 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10579098 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000265194 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11230559 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000265194 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10292933 035 $a(PQKB)10020937 035 $a(OCoLC)63193418 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse6244 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3407675 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10579098 035 $a(DE-B1597)683920 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780791483787 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3407675 035 $a(Perlego)2673204 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000458767 100 $a20040227d2005 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aUnited we stand? $edivide-and-conquer politics and the logic of international hostility /$fAaron Belkin 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aAlbany $cState University of New York Press$dc2005 215 $a1 online resource (172 p.) 225 1 $aSUNY series in global politics 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a9780791463444 311 08$a0791463443 311 08$a9780791463437 311 08$a0791463435 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 131-156) and index. 327 $tFront Matter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction -- $tRegime Vulnerability and International Conflict -- $tTheory -- $tCoup Risk and Military Division: Hostility within the Armed Forces and Regime Survival -- $tA Theory of Counterbalancing as a Cause of International Conflict -- $tData -- $tRegime Vulnerability, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict during the Cold War: A Quantitative Analysis -- $tRegime Vulnerability as a Cause of Counterbalancing in Syria in the Early 1970s -- $tWhen Dividing the Military Provides an Incentive for Conflict: Fragmented Military Forces and International Conflict in Shevardnadze?s Georgia -- $tConclusion -- $tNotes -- $tReferences -- $tIndex -- $tSUNY series in Global Politics 330 $aIt has long been assumed that leaders engage in international conflict to unify their followers?what is often called the "rally 'round the flag" hypothesis. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this hypothesis does not always provide a compelling explanation of the relationship between domestic politics and international conflict. In United We Stand? Aaron Belkin shows that in one important realm, civil-military relations, leaders often prefer divisiveness over cohesion. When they feel domestically vulnerable, leaders use international conflict in order to create and exacerbate rivalries among their own military forces to lower the risk of a coup and to contribute to the consolidation and stability of the political order. Case studies include post-Soviet Georgia and Syria. 410 0$aSUNY series in global politics. 606 $aInternational relations 606 $aConflict management 606 $aWorld politics 615 0$aInternational relations. 615 0$aConflict management. 615 0$aWorld politics. 676 $a327.1/6 700 $aBelkin$b Aaron$f1966-$01806055 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910966719403321 996 $aUnited we stand$94354994 997 $aUNINA