LEADER 01048nam a2200313 i 4500 001 991001228029707536 005 20020507113134.0 008 970308s1977 us ||| | eng 020 $a0471030716 035 $ab10191355-39ule_inst 035 $aLE00644264$9ExL 040 $aDip.to Fisica$bita 084 $a510'.28 084 $a621.3.8 084 $aQA75.S555 100 1 $aSmith, Jon M.$0463802 245 10$aScientific analysis on the pocket calculator /$cJon M. Smith 250 $a2nd ed. 260 $aNew York :$bJohn Wiley & Sons,$c1977 300 $axii, 445 p. ;$c23 cm. 440 2$aA Wiley-Interscience Publication 500 $aIncludes index. 650 4$aCalculating - Machines 907 $a.b10191355$b24-05-11$c27-06-02 912 $a991001228029707536 945 $aLE006 621.3.8 SMI$g1$i2006000051224$lle006$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$s- $t0$u0$v0$w0$x0$y.i10235991$z27-06-02 996 $aScientific analysis on the pocket calculator$9191606 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale006$b01-01-97$cm$da $e-$feng$gus $h0$i1 LEADER 05842oam 22010454 450 001 9910965598403321 005 20250426110652.0 010 $a9786612842535 010 $a9781462311385 010 $a1462311385 010 $a9781452787411 010 $a1452787417 010 $a9781451871784 010 $a1451871783 010 $a9781282842533 010 $a1282842536 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055203 035 $a(EBL)1608176 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000941480 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11473995 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941480 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10963971 035 $a(PQKB)11134282 035 $a(OCoLC)680613619 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009031 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608176 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2009031 035 $aWPIEA2009031 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055203 100 $a20020129d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aIn Search of WTO Trade Effects : $ePreferential Trade Agreements Promote Trade Strongly, But Unevenly /$fTheo Eicher, Christian Henn 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (32 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 08$a9781451916140 311 08$a1451916140 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Data; III. Extending the Empirical Framework to Account for Individual PTA Effects; A. Results: WTO Trade Impact After Controlling for Multilateral Resistance and Individual PTA Effects (Hierarchical, Mutually Exclusive WTO Coding); B. Hierarchical, Mutually Exclusive Coding and SW's "Implicit Industrialized PTA Dummy"; IV. Individual PTA Effects, Multilateral Resistance, and Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity 327 $aA. WTO Trade Impact: Controlling for Multilateral Resistance, Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity and Individual PTA Effects (Hierarchical/Mutually Exclusive WTO Coding)V. Individual PTA Trade Effects, Multilateral Resistance, and Unobserved Bilateral Hetergeneity (Mutually Inclusive WTO Coding); A. WTO Trade Impact: Controlling for Multilateral Resistance, Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity and Individual PTA Effects (Mutually Inclusive WTO Coding); VI. Individual PTA Trade Effects: Sensitivity to Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity and Multilateral Resistance Controls; VII. Conclusion 327 $aReferencesTables; 1. WTO and PTA Effects (Hierarchical, Mutually Exclusive Coding); 1.a. Raw Regression Output; 2. WTO and PTA Effects (Inclusive Coding); Appendices; A1. Membership in considered Preferential Trading Arrangements; A2. Bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements considered in BilateralPTAmxt; A3. List of Countries in sample and year of WTO accession; B1. De jure coding. WTO and PTA Effects (Hierarchical, Mutually Exclusive Coding); B1.a. Raw Regression Output De jure Coding; B2. De jure coding. WTO and PTA Effects (Inclusive Coding) 330 3 $aThe literature measuring the impact of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) and WTO membership on trade flows has produced remarkably diverse results. Rose's (2004) seminal paper reports a range of specifications that show no WTO effects, but Subramanian and Wei (2007) contend that he does not fully control for multilateral resistance (which could bias WTO estimates). Subramanian and Wei (2007) address multilateral resistance comprehensively to report strong WTO trade effects for industrialized countries but do not account for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity (which could inflate WTO estimates). We unify these two approaches by accounting for both multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, while also allowing for individual trade effects of PTAs. WTO effects vanish and remain insignificant throughout once multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual PTA effects are introduced. The result is robust to the use of alternative definitions and coding conventions for WTO membership that have been employed by Rose (2004), Tomz et al. (2007), or by Subramanian and Wei's (2007). 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2009/031 606 $aTerms of trade 606 $aTariff preferences 606 $aBalance of trade$2imf 606 $aCommercial treaties$2imf 606 $aEmpirical Studies of Trade$2imf 606 $aExports and Imports$2imf 606 $aImports$2imf 606 $aInternational economics$2imf 606 $aInternational Trade Organizations$2imf 606 $aInternational trade$2imf 606 $aNorth American Free Trade Agreement$2imf 606 $aPlurilateral trade$2imf 606 $aTrade agreements$2imf 606 $aTrade balance$2imf 606 $aTrade Policy$2imf 606 $aTrade: General$2imf 607 $aLuxembourg$2imf 615 0$aTerms of trade. 615 0$aTariff preferences. 615 7$aBalance of trade 615 7$aCommercial treaties 615 7$aEmpirical Studies of Trade 615 7$aExports and Imports 615 7$aImports 615 7$aInternational economics 615 7$aInternational Trade Organizations 615 7$aInternational trade 615 7$aNorth American Free Trade Agreement 615 7$aPlurilateral trade 615 7$aTrade agreements 615 7$aTrade balance 615 7$aTrade Policy 615 7$aTrade: General 676 $a382.3;382.30973 700 $aEicher$b Theo$01176252 701 $aHenn$b Christian$01815818 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910965598403321 996 $aIn Search of WTO Trade Effects$94371348 997 $aUNINA