LEADER 03782nam 2200757 a 450 001 9910965305803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9786612964534 010 $a9781282964532 010 $a1282964534 010 $a9781400836819 010 $a1400836816 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400836819 035 $a(CKB)2670000000066852 035 $a(EBL)664551 035 $a(OCoLC)698912870 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000467313 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11342602 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000467313 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10467108 035 $a(PQKB)11557935 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36870 035 $a(DE-B1597)447040 035 $a(OCoLC)979623956 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400836819 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL664551 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10443115 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL296453 035 $a(PPN)170271080 035 $a(Perlego)735031 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC664551 035 $a(FR-PaCSA)45008223 035 $a(FRCYB45008223)45008223 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000066852 100 $a20100729d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe blame game $espin, bureaucracy, and self-preservation in government /$fChristopher Hood 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (239 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 08$a9780691162126 311 08$a0691162123 311 08$a9780691129952 311 08$a0691129959 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $apt. 1. Blame, credit, and trust in executive government -- pt. 2. Avoiding blame : three basic strategies -- pt. 3. Living in a world of blame avoidance. 330 $aThe blame game, with its finger-pointing and mutual buck-passing, is a familiar feature of politics and organizational life, and blame avoidance pervades government and public organizations at every level. Political and bureaucratic blame games and blame avoidance are more often condemned than analyzed. In The Blame Game, Christopher Hood takes a different approach by showing how blame avoidance shapes the workings of government and public services. Arguing that the blaming phenomenon is not all bad, Hood demonstrates that it can actually help to pin down responsibility, and he examines different kinds of blame avoidance, both positive and negative. Hood traces how the main forms of blame avoidance manifest themselves in presentational and "spin" activity, the architecture of organizations, and the shaping of standard operating routines. He analyzes the scope and limits of blame avoidance, and he considers how it plays out in old and new areas, such as those offered by the digital age of websites and e-mail. Hood assesses the effects of this behavior, from high-level problems of democratic accountability trails going cold to the frustrations of dealing with organizations whose procedures seem to ensure that no one is responsible for anything. Delving into the inner workings of complex institutions, The Blame Game proves how a better understanding of blame avoidance can improve the quality of modern governance, management, and organizational design. 606 $aGovernment accountability 606 $aBlame$xPolitical aspects 615 0$aGovernment accountability. 615 0$aBlame$xPolitical aspects. 676 $a320.01 686 $aMD 6300$2rvk 700 $aHood$b Christopher$f1947-$0291901 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910965305803321 996 $aThe blame game$94336846 997 $aUNINA LEADER 03448nam 2200673Ia 450 001 9910954366103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9781439903704 010 $a1439903700 035 $a(CKB)2670000000055842 035 $a(EBL)616008 035 $a(OCoLC)693761467 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000517341 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11332271 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000517341 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10487726 035 $a(PQKB)10180150 035 $a(OCoLC)694147126 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse15475 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL616008 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10428925 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL289910 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC616008 035 $a(Perlego)2039769 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000055842 100 $a19941019d1995 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBroken promise $ethe subversion of U.S. labor relations policy, 1947-1994 /$fJames A. Gross 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aPhiladelphia $cTemple University Press$d1995 215 $a1 online resource (423 p.) 225 1 $aLabor And Social Change 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 08$a9781566393256 311 08$a1566393256 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aContents; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1. Taft-Hartley: A Fundamental Change in Labor Policy or Merely Adjustments to Eliminate Abuses?; 2. Political Maneuvering to Control a New Law, a New Board, and a New Labor Czar; 3. Improper Influences; 4. Repeal Taft-Hurley: A Tale of Missed Opportunities; 5. Taft-Hurley Was Here to Stay; 6. Bargaining National Labor Policy: A Misguided Process; 7. The Eisenhower Board Remakes Labor Policy; 8. Labor Law Reform, Employer Style; 9. The New Frontier Labor Board: A Commitment to Industrial Democracy 327 $a10. A New Labor Policy: Taking Industrial Democracy Seriously11. Irreconcilable Differences; 12. Making the Law Favor Employers Again; 13. Management Interests over Workers' Statutory Rights: The Final Irrelevance of National Labor Policy?; 14. Conclusion; Notes; Index 330 $aThe Wagner Act of 1935 (later the Wagner-Taft-Hartley Act of 1947) was intended to democratize vast numbers of American workplaces: the federal government was to encourage worker organization and the substitution of collective bargaining for employers' unilateral determination of vital work-place matters. Yet this system of industrial democracy was never realized; the promise was ""broken."" In this rare inside look at the process of government regulation over the last forty-five years, James A. Gross analyzes why the promise of the policy was never fulfilled. Gross looks at how the Nati 410 0$aLabor And Social Change 606 $aLabor policy$zUnited States$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aIndustrial relations$zUnited States$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aLabor laws and legislation$zUnited States$xHistory$y20th century 615 0$aLabor policy$xHistory 615 0$aIndustrial relations$xHistory 615 0$aLabor laws and legislation$xHistory 676 $a331/.0973 700 $aGross$b James A.$f1933-$01625111 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910954366103321 996 $aBroken promise$94359259 997 $aUNINA