LEADER 04108nam 2200889Ia 450 001 9910964512403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9786612935282 010 $a9786612087097 010 $a9781400814046 010 $a1400814049 010 $a9781282087095 010 $a1282087096 010 $a9781282935280 010 $a1282935283 010 $a9781400825042 010 $a1400825040 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400825042 035 $a(CKB)1000000000756292 035 $a(EBL)445454 035 $a(OCoLC)362778395 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000137028 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11143560 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000137028 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10087486 035 $a(PQKB)10576160 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000137027 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12045824 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000137027 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10104294 035 $a(PQKB)23765133 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36148 035 $a(DE-B1597)446304 035 $a(OCoLC)979629084 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400825042 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL445454 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10284044 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL293528 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC445454 035 $a(PPN)187308799 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC31773186 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL31773186 035 $a(Perlego)734164 035 $a(FR-PaCSA)45003462 035 $a(FRCYB45003462)45003462 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000756292 100 $a20031208e20032002 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDescartes's method of doubt /$fJanet Broughton 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. ;$aOxford $cPrinceton University Press$d2003 215 $a1 online resource (235 p.) 300 $aOriginally published, 2002. 311 08$a9780691088181 311 08$a0691088187 311 08$a9780691117324 311 08$a0691117322 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 203-209) and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tAbbreviations -- $tIntroduction -- $tPart 1. Raising Doubt -- $tPart 2. Using doubt -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aDescartes thought that we could achieve absolute certainty by starting with radical doubt. He adopts this strategy in the Meditations on First Philosophy, where he raises sweeping doubts with the famous dream argument and the hypothesis of an evil demon. But why did Descartes think we should take these exaggerated doubts seriously? And if we do take them seriously, how did he think any of our beliefs could ever escape them? Janet Broughton undertakes a close study of Descartes's first three meditations to answer these questions and to present a fresh way of understanding precisely what Descartes was up to. Broughton first contrasts Descartes's doubts with those of the ancient skeptics, arguing that Cartesian doubt has a novel structure and a distinctive relation to the commonsense outlook of everyday life. She then argues that Descartes pursues absolute certainty by uncovering the conditions that make his radical doubt possible. She gives a unified account of how Descartes uses this strategy, first to find certainty about his own existence and then to argue that God exists. Drawing on this analysis, Broughton provides a new way to understand Descartes's insistence that he hasn't argued in a circle, and she measures his ambitions against those of contemporary philosophers who use transcendental arguments in their efforts to defeat skepticism. The book is a powerful contribution both to the history of philosophy and to current debates in epistemology. 606 $aBelief and doubt 606 $aKnowledge, Theory of 615 0$aBelief and doubt. 615 0$aKnowledge, Theory of. 676 $a194 700 $aBroughton$b Janet$f1948-$0985550 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910964512403321 996 $aDescartes's method of doubt$94337936 997 $aUNINA