LEADER 01516nam 2200361Ia 450 001 996386189303316 005 20200824132158.0 035 $a(CKB)4940000000082554 035 $a(EEBO)2240860138 035 $a(OCoLC)ocm17008759e 035 $a(OCoLC)17008759 035 $a(EXLCZ)994940000000082554 100 $a19871120d1671 uy | 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurbn||||a|bb| 200 10$aExercitations concerning the name, original, nature, use, and continuance of a day of sacred rest$b[electronic resource] $ewherein the original of the Sabbath from the foundation of the world, the morality of the Fourth commandment, with the change of the seventh day are enquired into : together with an assertion of the divine institution of the Lord's Day, and practical directions for its due observation /$fby John Owen 205 $aThe second edition. 210 $aLondon $cPrinted by R.W. for Nath. Ponder ...$d1671 215 $a[12], 354 [i.e. 352], [2] p 300 $aAdvertisement: [2] p. at end. 300 $aNumerous errors in paging. 300 $aReproduction of original in the Huntington Library. 330 $aeebo-0113 606 $aSabbath$vEarly works to 1800 615 0$aSabbath 700 $aOwen$b John$f1616-1683.$01002389 801 0$bEAH 801 1$bEAH 801 2$bWaOLN 906 $aBOOK 912 $a996386189303316 996 $aExercitations concerning the name, original, nature, use, and continuance of a day of sacred rest$92333430 997 $aUNISA LEADER 04521nam 2200553 a 450 001 9910963682503321 005 20251117005943.0 010 $a1-61728-133-6 035 $a(CKB)2670000000041787 035 $a(EBL)3020017 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000411492 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12101437 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000411492 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10356577 035 $a(PQKB)10073758 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3020017 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3020017 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10675025 035 $a(OCoLC)923662179 035 $a(BIP)33697911 035 $a(BIP)25773051 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000041787 100 $a20090302d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aAl Qaeda in Iraq /$fDavid H. Naylor, editor 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aHauppauge, N.Y. $cNova Science Publishers$dc2009 215 $a1 online resource (130 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 08$a1-60692-652-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aAl Qaeda in Iraq : assessment and outside links / Kenneth Katzman -- Iraq : post-Saddam governance and security / Kenneth Katzman. 330 $aIn explaining the decision to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein from power, the Administration asserted, among other justifications, that the regime of Saddam Hussein had a working relationship with the Al Qaeda organization. The Administration assessed that the relationship dated to the early 1990s, and was based on a common interest in confronting the United States. The Administration assertions were derived from U.S. intelligence showing a pattern of contacts with Al Qaeda when its key founder, Osama bin Laden, was based in Sudan in the early to mid-1990s and continuing after he relocated to Afghanistan in 1996.Critics maintain that subsequent research demonstrates that the relationship, if it existed, was not a?eoeoperational,a?e and that no hard data has come to light indicating the two entities conducted any joint terrorist attacks. Some major hallmarks of an operational relationship were absent, and several experts outside and within the U.S. government believe that contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda were sporadic, unclear, or subject to alternate explanations.Another pillar of the Administration argument, which has applications for the current U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq, rested on reports of contacts between Baghdad and an Islamist Al Qaeda affiliate group, called Ansar al-Islam, based in northern Iraq in the late 1990s. Although the connections between Ansar al-Islam and Saddam Husseina?e(tm)s regime were subject to debate, the organization evolved into what is now known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). AQ-I has been a numerically small but operationally major component of the Sunni Arab-led insurgency that frustrated U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Since mid-2007, in part facilitated by combat conducted by additional U.S. forces sent to Iraq as part of a a?eoetroop surge,a?e the U.S. military has exploited differences between AQ-I and Iraqi Sunni political, tribal, and insurgent leaders to virtually expel AQ-I from many of its sanctuaries particularly in Baghdad and in Anbar Province. U.S. officials assess AQ-I to be weakened almost to the point of outright defeat in Iraq, although they say it remains lethal and has the potential to revive in Iraq. Attacks continue, primarily in north-central Iraq, that bear the hallmarks of AQ-I tactics, and U.S. and Iraqi forces continue to conduct offensives targeting suspected AQ-I leaders and hideouts.As of mid-2008, there are indications that AQ-I leaders are relocating from Iraq to join Al Qaeda leaders believed to be in remote areas of Pakistan, near the Afghanistan border. That perception, if accurate, could suggest that AQ-I now perceives Afghanistan as more fertile ground than is Iraq to attack U.S. forces. The relocation of AQ-I leaders to Pakistan could also accelerate the perceived strengthening of the central Al Qaeda organization. 606 $aIraq War, 2003-2011 607 $aIraq$xPolitics and government$y2003- 615 0$aIraq War, 2003-2011. 676 $a363.32509567 701 $aNaylor$b David H$01871000 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910963682503321 996 $aAl Qaeda in Iraq$94479606 997 $aUNINA