LEADER 04449nam 2200649Ia 450 001 9910963041303321 005 20251117004021.0 010 $a1-281-97823-X 035 $a(CKB)1000000000722123 035 $a(OCoLC)654720994 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10274616 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000484022 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12190536 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000484022 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10573547 035 $a(PQKB)10791467 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3052922 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4702465 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4702465 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL197823 035 $a(OCoLC)1024278581 035 $a(OCoLC)18558910 035 $a(FINmELB)ELB163975 035 $a(BIP)46738819 035 $a(BIP)463563 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000722123 100 $a19880913d1989 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 04$aThe economic theory of agrarian institutions /$fedited by Pranab Bardhan 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aOxford [England] $cClarendon Press ;$aNew York $cOxford University Press$d1989 215 $a1 online resource (417 p.) 225 1 $aClarendon Paperbacks 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a0-19-828619-8 311 08$a0-19-152149-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntro -- Contents -- Contributors -- I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION -- 1. Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development -- 2. Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics -- II. LAND AND LABOUR -- 3. Theories of Sharecropping -- 4. A Comparison of Principal-Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts -- 5. Contracts with Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal-Agent Relationships -- 6. Production Relations in Semi-arid African Agriculture -- III. CREDIT AND INTERLINKED TRANSACTIONS -- 7. Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency -- 8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure -- 9. Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality -- 10. On Choice among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts -- 11.Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts among Risk-neutral Agents -- 12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements -- 13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition -- IV. MARKETING AND INSURANCE -- 14. Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization -- 15. Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts -- V. CO-OPERATIVES, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE STATE -- 16. Agricultural Producer Co-operatives -- 17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co-operatives -- 18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State -- Bibliography -- Index. 330 $aMany economists accept that institutions are of fundamental importance, although the analysis of their formation and behaviour has remained largely undiscussed. In this collection of papers, the contributors seek to demonstrate that advanced economic theory provides tools which may usefully be applied to an understanding of the operation of institutions, in this case with particular and significant implications for the problems faced by poor agrarian economies. They show that sound theoretical analysis can enable economists to reach conclusions that will enable practitioners to avoid many pitfalls in the formation and implementation of development policies, both within individual countries and in the context of international aid. Academic and policy-oriented researchers in development economics, agricultural economics and institutional economics should all find this work of value. 410 0$aClarendon Paperbacks 606 $aAgriculture$xEconomic aspects$zDeveloping countries 606 $aAgriculture and state$zDeveloping countries 615 0$aAgriculture$xEconomic aspects 615 0$aAgriculture and state 676 $a338.1/09172/4 701 $aBardhan$b Pranab K$0120966 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910963041303321 996 $aECONOMIC theory of agrarian institutions$93618598 997 $aUNINA