LEADER 01201nam0 22002891i 450 001 UON00013215 005 20231205101942.711 010 $a37-666-9894-X 100 $a20020107f1994 |0itac50 ba 101 $aeng 102 $aUS 105 $a|||| 1|||| 200 1 $aNeriglissar$eKing of Babylon$fRonald H. Sack 210 $aKevelaer$cButzon-Bercker$d1994 215 $aXIII, 241 p.$ctav.$d23 cm 410 1$1001UON00000604$12001 $aAlter Orient und Altes Testament$eVeroffentlichungen zur Kultur und Geschichte des Alten Orients und des Alten Testaments$fHrsg. Manfried Dietrech, Oswald Loretz$v236 606 $aBABILONIA$xSTORIA$3UONC002721$2FI 620 $dKevelaer$3UONL000690 686 $aVOA SERIE$cVICINO ORIENTE ANTICO - COLLANE$2A 700 1$aSACK$bRonald H.$3UONV010024$0640119 712 $aButzon & Bercker$3UONV246749$4650 801 $aIT$bSOL$c20240220$gRICA 899 $aSIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEO$2UONSI 912 $aUON00013215 950 $aSIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEO$dSI VOA SERIE 001 (236) $eSI SA 77733 5 (236) 996 $aNeriglissar$91179929 997 $aUNIOR LEADER 05449nam 2200613 a 450 001 9910962899003321 005 20251116153437.0 010 $a9786612268823 010 0 $a9780191569876 010 0 $a0191569879 010 $a9781282268821 010 $a1282268821 010 $a9780191609893 010 $a0191609897 010 $a9780199565306 010 $a0199565309 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7037410 035 $a(CKB)24235102500041 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC453603 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL453603 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10329709 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL226882 035 $a(OCoLC)654777858 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL7037410 035 $a(OCoLC)781297883 035 $a(EXLCZ)9924235102500041 100 $a20090515d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 12$aA primer in social choice theory /$fWulf Gaertner 205 $aRev. ed. 210 $aOxford ;$aNew York $cOxford University Press$dc2009 215 $axi, 218 p. $cill 225 1 $aLSE perspectives in economic analysis 300 $aPrevious ed. published in 2006. 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes. 327 $aCover -- A Primer in Social Choice Theory: Revised Edition -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Preface to the Revised Edition -- Preface and Acknowledgements to the First Edition -- Contents -- About the Author -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1. Basic questions -- 1.2. Catching a glimpse of the past -- 1.3. Basic formalism -- 1.4. Aggregation of preferences - how can this be done? -- 1.5. The informational aspect -- 1.6. A path through haze, or how to read this book -- 1.7. Some exercises -- 2: Arrow's impossibility result -- 2.1. The axiom system and the theorem -- 2.2. The original proof -- 2.3. A second proof -- 2.4. A third diagrammatic proof -- 2.5. A short summary -- 2.6. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCE -- MORE ADVANCED -- 3: Majority decision under restricted domains -- 3.1. The simple majority rule -- 3.2. Single-peaked preferences -- 3.3. Other domain conditions: qualitative and quantitative -- 3.4. A short summary -- 3.5. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 4: Individual rights -- 4.1. Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal -- 4.2. Gibbard's theory of alienable rights -- 4.3. Conditional and unconditional preferences -- 4.4. Conditional and unconditional preferences again: matching pennies and the prisoners' dilemma -- 4.5. The game form approach to rights -- 4.6. A short summary -- 4.7. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 5: Manipulability -- 5.1. The underlying problem -- 5.2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- 5.3. Strategy-proofness and restricted domains -- 5.4. A short summary -- 5.5. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 6: Escaping impossibilities: social choice rules -- 6.1. The Pareto-extension rule and veto power -- 6.2. Scoring functions and the Borda rule. 327 $a6.3. Other social choice rules -- 6.4. A parliamentary vote: Berlin vs. Bonn -- 6.5. A short summary -- 6.6. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCE -- MORE ADVANCED -- 7: Distributive justice: Rawlsian and utilitarian rules -- 7.1. The philosophical background -- 7.2. The informational structure -- 7.3. Axioms and characterizations -- 7.4. Diagrammatic proofs again -- 7.5. Harsanyi's utilitarianism -- 7.6. A short summary -- 7.7. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 8: Cooperative bargaining -- 8.1. The bargaining problem -- 8.2. Nash's bargaining solution -- 8.3. Zeuthen's principle of alternating concessions -- 8.4. The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution -- 8.5. A philosopher's view -- 8.6. Kalai's egalitarian solution -- 8.7. A short summary -- 8.8. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCES -- MORE ADVANCED -- 9: Empirical social choice -- 9.1. Theory and opinions of the general public -- 9.2. Needs vs. tastes - the approach by Yaari and Bar-Hillel -- 9.3. Rawls's equity axiom - how does it fare? -- 9.4. From here to where? -- 9.5. A short summary -- 9.6. Some exercises -- RECOMMENDED READING -- HISTORICAL SOURCE -- 10: A few steps beyond -- 10.1. Social choice rules in continuous space -- 10.2. The uniform rule -- 10.3. Freedom of choice -- 10.4. An epilogue instead of a summary -- References -- Hints to the Exercises -- Chapter 1 -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- Chapter 8 -- Chapter 9 -- Author Index -- Subject Index. 330 $aThis introductory text explores the theory of social choice. This text is an important starting point for students grappling with the complexities of social choice theory. Rigorous yet accessible, with new chapter exercises, it avoids the use of technical language and provides an up-to-date discussion of this rapidly developing field. 410 0$aLSE perspectives in economic analysis. 606 $aSocial choice 615 0$aSocial choice. 676 $a302/.1301 700 $aGaertner$b Wulf$0121855 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910962899003321 996 $aA primer in social choice theory$94365547 997 $aUNINA