LEADER 03786oam 2200685 a 450 001 9910962519103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9798400691157 010 $a9780313012020 010 $a0313012024 024 7 $a10.5040/9798400691157 035 $a(CKB)111087026964014 035 $a(OCoLC)70750345 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10023103 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000210592 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11180271 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000210592 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10292157 035 $a(PQKB)10626475 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3000796 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10023103 035 $a(OCoLC)929145050 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3000796 035 $a(OCoLC)1176048553 035 $a(DLC)BP9798400691157BC 035 $a(Perlego)4202570 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111087026964014 100 $a20011114e20022024 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 12$aA new nuclear century $estrategic stability and arms control /$fStephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWestport, Conn. :$cPraeger,$d2002. 210 2$aLondon :$cBloomsbury Publishing,$d2024 215 $a1 online resource (205 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a9780275970611 311 08$a0275970612 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aMachine generated contents note: Acknowledgments --Introduction --1 First-Strike Stability Modeling: The Crazy Mathematics of -- the Cold War --2 Redefining Strategic Stability --3 Friction and Nuclear Deterrence --4 Triad and Tribulation: U.S. and Russian START Options --5 Proliferation in an Unstable World --Conclusion --Further Reading --Index. 330 8 $aCimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled. This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved. They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship between the United States and Russia-one characterized by cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars, and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues. 606 $aDeterrence (Strategy) 606 $aNuclear arms control 606 $aWorld politics$y1989- 615 0$aDeterrence (Strategy) 615 0$aNuclear arms control. 615 0$aWorld politics 676 $a327.1/747 700 $aCimbala$b Stephen J$0846069 701 $aScouras$b James$01798481 801 0$bDLC 801 1$bDLC 801 2$bDLC 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910962519103321 996 $aA new nuclear century$94341283 997 $aUNINA