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100   $a19920402d1992      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aTruth and objectivity /$fCrispin Wright
210   $aCambridge, MA $cHarvard University Press$d1992
215   $a1 online resource (x,247p.) 
300   $aIncludes index.
311 08$a9780674910867 
311 08$a0674910869 
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311 08$a0674910877 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $a1. Inflating Deflationism 2. Minimal Truth, Internal Realism and Superassertibility 3. Convergence and Cognitive Command Appendix: The Euthyphro Contrast 4. Cognitive Command and the Theoreticity of Observation 5. Realism and the Best Explanation of Belief 6. Quietism Appendix: On an Argument against the Coherence of Minimalism about Meaning Index
330 8 $aOffers a perspective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. The text contains critical discussions of central concerns of realism philosophers, including "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, and scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation.$bCrispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including the "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, and the role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs.
606   $aRealism
606   $aPhilosophy
615  0$aRealism.
615  0$aPhilosophy.
676   $a121
700   $aWright$b Crispin$f1942-$053819
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801  1$bMiAaPQ
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906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910962204603321
996   $aTruth and objectivity$9105254
997   $aUNINA