LEADER 03522nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910961696103321 005 20251116141227.0 010 $a9786610210848 010 $a9780309175104 010 $a0309175100 010 $a9781280210846 010 $a1280210842 010 $a9780309553230 010 $a0309553237 010 $a9780585002118 010 $a0585002118 035 $a(CKB)110986584753452 035 $a(OCoLC)42328503 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10062932 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000224825 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11202317 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000224825 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10210878 035 $a(PQKB)10380461 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3377004 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3377004 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10062932 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL21084 035 $a(OCoLC)923267608 035 $a(Perlego)4735978 035 $a(BIP)47377454 035 $a(EXLCZ)99110986584753452 100 $a19961125d1997 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aPost-Cold war conflict deterrence 210 $aWashington, D.C. $cNational Academy Press$d1997 215 $a1 online resource (243 p.) 300 $a"Naval Studies Board, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, National Research Council." 311 08$a9780309056397 311 08$a030905639X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 330 $aDeterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions. 606 $aMilitary policy 606 $aNuclear warfare 606 $aDeterrence (Strategy) 615 0$aMilitary policy. 615 0$aNuclear warfare. 615 0$aDeterrence (Strategy) 676 $a327.1/72 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910961696103321 996 $aPost-Cold war conflict deterrence$94352174 997 $aUNINA