LEADER 01203cam2-2200409---450- 001 990006020060203316 005 20150326094209.0 010 $a978-88-14-19281-4 035 $a000602006 035 $aUSA01000602006 035 $a(ALEPH)000602006USA01 035 $a000602006 100 $a20010615d2015----|||y0itay0103----ba 101 0 $aita 102 $aIT 105 $a||||||||001yy 200 1 $a<> azioni possessorie e di nunciazione [2. ed.]$fAlberto Giusti$vArtt. 1168-1172 205 $a2. ed. 210 $aMilano$cGiuffrè$d2015 215 $aXV, 349 p.$d25 cm 410 0$12001 454 1$12001 461 1$10010032193$12001$a<> codice civile 676 $a346.45 702 1$aSCHLESINGER,$bPiero 702 1$aGIUSTI,$bAlberto 710 02$aSCARPA,$bAntonio$0752823 801 0$aIT$bSALBC$gISBD 912 $a990006020060203316 951 $aXXV.1.B. 694 25a$b81921 G.$cXXV.1.B. 694 25$d368526 959 $aBK 969 $aGIU 979 $aFIORELLA$b90$c20150326$lUSA01$h0936 979 $aFIORELLA$b90$c20150326$lUSA01$h0940 979 $aFIORELLA$b90$c20150326$lUSA01$h0942 996 $aAzioni possessorie e di nunciazione$91514132 997 $aUNISA LEADER 05392oam 2200673 a 450 001 9910957447203321 005 20030910130419.0 010 $a9798400683800 010 $a9780313000652 010 $a0313000654 024 7 $a10.5040/9798400683800 035 $a(CKB)111056485428086 035 $a(OCoLC)613393488 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10001980 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000199443 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11187643 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000199443 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10196495 035 $a(PQKB)10622831 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3000357 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10001980 035 $a(OCoLC)929144398 035 $a(OCoLC)43706639 035 $a(DLC)BP9798400683800BC 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3000357 035 $a(Perlego)4202147 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111056485428086 100 $a20000317e20012024 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMaximization, whatever the cost $erace, redistricting, and the Department of Justice /$fMaurice T. Cunningham 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWestport, Conn. :$cPraeger,$d2001. 210 2$aLondon :$cBloomsbury Publishing,$d2024 215 $a1 online resource (191 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a9780275966492 311 08$a0275966496 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [165]-171) and index. 327 $aCover -- Maximization, Whatever the Cost -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 The Mystery of Racial Redistricting in the Nineties -- NOTES -- 2 Transformation -- ENFORCEMENT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 -- The Johnson Administration and the Early Years -- The Nixon Administration and the Seventies -- The Reagan Administration-Conflict Masks a Transformation -- THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 3 Bureaucratic Culture of the Voting Section -- FORGING A PATH -- PERSONNEL IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION -- Political Appointees -- The Professionals -- REGULATORY FRAMEWORK -- HUNKERING DOWN IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 4 The Department's New Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act -- TRADITIONAL AND MODERN APPROACHES IN THE SUPREME COURT -- NUDGING THE COURT DOWN A PROGRESSIVE PATH -- THE SECTION TWO RESULTS TEST, GINGLES, AND INCORPORATION -- A NEW INTERPRETATION OF DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE -- PURPOSE AS POLICY-OBJECTION LETTERS -- CARRYING THE FIGHT TO THE COURTS -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 5 External Influences on the Department's Decision Making -- ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN THE VOTING RIGHTS ARENA -- CIVIL RIGHTS INTEREST GROUPS -- THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AS VOTING RIGHTS ADVOCATE -- THE STATES -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 6 From Compromised Compliance to Conquered Provinces -- NORTH CAROLINA -- GEORGIA -- LOUISIANA -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 7 Processes and Products of Voting Rights Act Enforcement -- PROCESSES OF THE DEPARTMENT'S ENFORCEMENT -- PRODUCTS OF THE DEPARTMENT'S ENFORCEMENT -- Federalism -- Effect on Representation -- Damage to the Department -- TOWARD A RESTORATION -- NOTES -- Afterword -- NOTES -- Selected Bibliography -- CASE LAW -- REFERENCES -- Index -- About the Author. 330 8 $aDuring the early 1990s the Department of Justice used its Voting Rights Act power to object to racially unfair redistricting laws to force states to maximize minority congressional districts. The results were dramatic: Congressional Black Caucus membership swelled from 25 to 38 and nine new Hispanic congresspersons were sworn in. Only three years later, the maximization strategy lay in ruins. The courts forced many of the new minority districts to be redrawn and the judiciary reserved especially harsh criticism for the Department. Cunningham examines and analyzes how the Department came to adopt the maximization strategy. He explores the bureaucratic culture of the Division's Voting Section, its history, and the interaction of its progressive career staff with more conservative political appointees. The Division works amidst a vibrant interest group environment, with civil rights advocates, the state, and political parties eager for influence. Cunningham shows how that influence contest was won by the civil rights groups, how their preferred interpretations of fair redistricting and discriminatory purpose were adopted by the Division, and how their chosen districting models were forced upon states by the Division. He examines the effect the Department has had on federalism, representation, and its own impaired credibility with the judiciary. Finally, he suggests how the Division might resurrect its damaged reputation for balanced enforcement. An important study for scholars, students, and public policy makers involved with civil rights, public administration, and public law. 606 $aElection districts$zUnited States 606 $aApportionment (Election law)$zUnited States 606 $aAfrican Americans$xSegregation 615 0$aElection districts 615 0$aApportionment (Election law) 615 0$aAfrican Americans$xSegregation. 676 $a328.73/07345 700 $aCunningham$b Maurice T$0958074 801 0$bDLC 801 1$bDLC 801 2$bDLC 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910957447203321 996 $aMaximization, whatever the cost$94337923 997 $aUNINA