LEADER 05293oam 22012614 450 001 9910956788003321 005 20250426110742.0 010 $a9786613775917 010 $a9781462389452 010 $a1462389457 010 $a9781452756363 010 $a1452756368 010 $a9781281092861 010 $a128109286X 010 $a9781451890808 010 $a145189080X 035 $a(CKB)3360000000440961 035 $a(EBL)3012568 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000948674 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11541741 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000948674 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10951877 035 $a(PQKB)11180943 035 $a(OCoLC)535146986 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3012568 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE0092004 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA0092004 035 $aWPIEA0092004 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000440961 100 $a20020129d2004 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aTiming of International Bailouts /$fSe-Jik Kim 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2004. 215 $a1 online resource (42 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aCover title. 300 $a"January 2004"--Caption. 311 08$a9781451842623 311 08$a1451842627 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 39-41). 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CRISIS-PREVENTION FACILITY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""IV. LAISSEZ-FAIRE""; ""V. EXISTING CRISIS-LENDING FACILITIES""; ""VI. TIMING-BASED CRISIS-LENDING FACILITY""; ""VII. EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS""; ""VIII. CONCLUSION""; ""APPENDIX I""; ""APPENDIX II""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aThis paper proposes that international rescue financing should not be provided to a country where a crisis first occurs, but rather to any country that suffers a subsequent crisis. Such a timing-based lending facility can be Pareto-superior to both laissez-faire and existing international crisis lending facilities, when domestic governments have more information on their own economies than does the international lender of last resort. The new facility mitigates moral hazard owing to information asymmetry by not rescuing the first-hit country. At the same time, it limits crisis contagion by rescuing countries in subsequent crises. Even in the presence of common shocks, the timing-based facility can reduce global risks of crisis because it induces countries to undertake greater crisis-prevention efforts so as not to become the first country hit. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2004/009 606 $aEconomic assistance 606 $aFinancial crises 606 $aMoral hazard 606 $aBanks and banking, Central$2imf 606 $aCrisis management$2imf 606 $aCrisis prevention$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aFinancial risk management$2imf 606 $aFinancial sector policy and analysis$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aIndustrial productivity$2imf 606 $aInternational Lending and Debt Problems$2imf 606 $aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions$2imf 606 $aLender of last resort$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics: Production$2imf 606 $aMoral hazard$2imf 606 $aProduction and Operations Management$2imf 606 $aProduction$2imf 606 $aProductivity$2imf 607 $aArgentina$2imf 615 0$aEconomic assistance. 615 0$aFinancial crises. 615 0$aMoral hazard. 615 7$aBanks and banking, Central 615 7$aCrisis management 615 7$aCrisis prevention 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aFinancial risk management 615 7$aFinancial sector policy and analysis 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aIndustrial productivity 615 7$aInternational Lending and Debt Problems 615 7$aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions 615 7$aLender of last resort 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMacroeconomics: Production 615 7$aMoral hazard 615 7$aProduction and Operations Management 615 7$aProduction 615 7$aProductivity 700 $aKim$b Se-Jik$01623190 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bResearch Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910956788003321 996 $aTiming of International Bailouts$94372479 997 $aUNINA