LEADER 00775nam0-2200289---450- 001 990009085680403321 005 20090903115708.0 010 $a0-12-403350-4 035 $a000908568 035 $aFED01000908568 035 $a(Aleph)000908568FED01 035 $a000908568 100 $a20090903d1978----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aeng 102 $aUS 105 $a--------001yy 200 1 $aArrow impossibility theorems$fJerry S. Kelly 210 $aNew York [etc.]$cAcademic Press$d1978 215 $axi, 194 p$d24 cm. 700 1$aKelly,$bJerry S.$0246245 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990009085680403321 952 $aD7.9$b7252$fDECTS 959 $aDECTS 996 $aArrow impossibility theorems$9784186 997 $aUNINA LEADER 03544nam 2200781Ia 450 001 9910956514803321 005 20251117095645.0 010 $a9786613681300 010 $a9781280770531 010 $a1280770538 010 $a9780300167580 010 $a030016758X 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300167580 035 $a(CKB)2550000000104173 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH24487555 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000694218 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11444051 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000694218 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10666904 035 $a(PQKB)11090486 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3420874 035 $a(DE-B1597)485744 035 $a(OCoLC)801411247 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300167580 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3420874 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10571000 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL368130 035 $a(OCoLC)923598529 035 $a(Perlego)1089730 035 $z(OCoLC)801411247 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000104173 100 $a20111118d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe vulnerability thesis $einterest group influence and institutional design /$fLorelei K. Moosbrugger 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aNew Haven $cYale University Press$dc2012 215 $a1 online resource (288 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a9780300166798 311 08$a0300166796 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $t1. Interest Group Influence And Institutional Design -- $t2. The Vulnerability Thesis -- $t3. Evidence From The Environment -- $t4. The European Union -- $t5. The United Kingdom: Minority Influence And Majority Rule -- $t6. Germany: The Politics Of Paying The Polluter -- $t7. Austria: Political Cover And Policy Choice -- $t8. Sweden: Minority Representation And The Majority Interest -- $t9. Institutional Design And The Quality Of Democracy -- $tNotes -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aWhere politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The "vulnerability thesis" is that the electoral system is largely to blame, making politicians in two-party systems more vulnerable to interest group demands than politicians in multiparty systems. Political scientist Lorelei Moosbrugger ranks democracies on a continuum of political vulnerability and tests the thesis by examining agrochemical policy in Austria, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the European Union. 606 $aMajorities$vCase studies 606 $aMajorities 606 $aPressure groups$vCase studies 606 $aPressure groups 606 $aRepresentative government and representation$vCase studies 606 $aRepresentative government and representation 615 0$aMajorities 615 0$aMajorities. 615 0$aPressure groups 615 0$aPressure groups. 615 0$aRepresentative government and representation 615 0$aRepresentative government and representation. 676 $a322.4/3 700 $aMoosbrugger$b Lorelei K$01810062 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910956514803321 996 $aThe vulnerability thesis$94361195 997 $aUNINA