LEADER 03828nam 22005894a 450 001 9910954584003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9780313073519 010 $a0313073511 035 $a(CKB)1000000000001574 035 $a(OCoLC)70763993 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10002018 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000125627 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11144427 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000125627 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10026920 035 $a(PQKB)10478280 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3000389 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10002018 035 $a(OCoLC)847135751 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3000389 035 $a(Perlego)4203015 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000001574 100 $a20010501d2001 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCommon-property arrangements and scarce resources $ewater in the American West /$fEdward M. Barbanell 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aWestport, Conn. $cPraeger$d2001 215 $a1 online resource (190 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 08$a9780275971731 311 08$a0275971732 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [165]-171) and index. 327 $aIntro -- Preface -- 1. Taking Scarcity Seriously -- 2. Water Rights Doctrines, East and West -- 3. The Structure of Property Rights and the Nature of Resources -- 4. Locke's Account of Property -- 5. Economics and Property Rights -- 6. Toward a Common-Property Arrangement for Water in the West -- Selected Bibliography -- Index. 330 8 $aIt is widely held that private ownership is the preferred end state for all scarce resources. Those who hold this view have not looked closely enough at water in the American West, Barbanell contends. Because of water's special attributes, private ownership is an ineffective means for protecting individuals interests. Splitting the various rights of ownership between individual resources users and the community to which they belong can better protect those interests. Barbanell develops a conception of this form of common ownership, a common-property arrangement, and shows that it can function effectively for water in the West. More generally, he offers an expanded framework for analyzing right relationships and examining problems related to resource scarcity. Some economists argue that John Locke's account of property justifies the private ownership of water in the West. Barbanell argues, however, that because Locke did not think carefully enough about the variable nature of resources, his account does not support that conclusion. Although economists recognize that private ownership may not be perfectly suited to all resources, they are nonetheless skeptical about common ownership alternatives. Barbanell shows that this skepticism is unwarranted. When the rights relationship among members of a resource community is based on mutual expectations of reciprocal behavior, then a common-property arrangement can function effectively to control the degradation and depletion of a scarce resource. Barbanell's argument that common ownership is a conceptually sound and politically viable alternative for water will be of particular interest to public policy makers, environmentalists, resource economists, and political philosophers. 606 $aWater-supply$zWest (U.S.) 606 $aNatural resources, Communal$zWest (U.S.) 615 0$aWater-supply 615 0$aNatural resources, Communal 676 $a363.6/1/0978 700 $aBarbanell$b Edward$01805177 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910954584003321 996 $aCommon-property arrangements and scarce resources$94353629 997 $aUNINA