LEADER 03689nam 2200685Ia 450 001 9910954297603321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8166-5574-X 010 $a0-8166-1534-9 035 $a(CKB)1000000000479248 035 $a(EBL)316632 035 $a(OCoLC)182732698 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000130050 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11144919 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000130050 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10081094 035 $a(PQKB)11466203 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC316632 035 $a(OCoLC)181183086 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse39012 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL316632 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10194348 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL525695 035 $a(OCoLC)437191388 035 $a(BIP)36009356 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000479248 100 $a19890315d1987 ub 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 00$aContractual arrangements for intertemporal trade /$fedited by Edward C. Prescott and Neil Wallace 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aMinneapolis, MN $cUniversity of Minnesota Press$dc1987 215 $a1 online resource (ix, 160 pages) $cillustrations 225 1 $aMinnesota studies in macroeconomics ;$vv. 1 311 0 $a0-8166-1533-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographies. 327 $aContents; Contributors; Preface; I. Lending and the Smoothing of Uninsurable Income; II. Demand Deposits, Trading Restrictions, and Risk Sharing; III. Private Information, the Real Bills Doctrine, and the Quantity Theory: An Alternative Approach; IV. Dealerships, Trading Externalities, and General Equilibrium; V. Circulating Private Debt: An Example with a Coordination Problem; VI. Incomplete Market Participation and the Optimal Exchange of Credit; VII. Dynamic Coalitions, Growth, and the Firm 330 $aContractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade was first published in 1987. The seven papers in this volume were presented at a conference at the University of Minnesota in 1984. They deal with various aspects of the specialness of intertemporal trade by studying environments in which such trade is more difficult to carry out than is trade in the standard general equilibrium model. Most of the papers impose difficulties in the form of private information or spatial separation linked with private information. The focus on intertemporal trade was motivated by observations related to such trade that seem anomalous from the point of view of the standard general equilibrium model: the semming incompleteness of risk-sharing markets, the existence of intermediaries, the occurrence of financial panics and run on banks, and the relatively heavy regulation of credit markets. Contributors: Edward J. Green, Charles J. Jacklin, Bruce D. Smith, Sudipto Bhattacharya, Kathleen Hagerty, Robert Townsend, Neil Wallace, Lawrence M. Benveniste, Edward C. Prescott, and John H. Boyd. 410 0$aMinnesota studies in macroeconomics ;$vv. 1. 606 $aDemand functions (Economic theory)$vCongresses 606 $aSpeculation$vCongresses 606 $aEquilibrium (Economics)$vCongresses 606 $aExchange$vCongresses 615 0$aDemand functions (Economic theory) 615 0$aSpeculation 615 0$aEquilibrium (Economics) 615 0$aExchange 676 $a332.64/4/0724 701 $aPrescott$b Edward C$0127092 701 $aWallace$b Neil$0125416 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910954297603321 996 $aContractual arrangements for intertemporal trade$94480017 997 $aUNINA