LEADER 04510nam 22009372 450 001 9910953666703321 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a9781139604147 010 $a1139604147 010 $a9781139611015 010 $a1139611011 010 $a9781139609234 010 $a1139609238 010 $a9781139612876 010 $a1139612875 010 $a9781139622172 010 $a113962217X 010 $a9781139625890 010 $a1139625896 010 $a9781139616591 010 $a1139616595 010 $a9781139343237 010 $a1139343238 024 7 $a2027/heb32607 035 $a(CKB)2670000000329911 035 $a(EBL)1099929 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000821315 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11436120 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000821315 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10870948 035 $a(PQKB)10578930 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139343237 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1099929 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1099929 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10843187 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL581057 035 $a(OCoLC)871223690 035 $a(dli)HEB32607 035 $a(MiU) MIU01100000000000000000120 035 $a(MiU)MIU01100000000000000000120 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000329911 100 $a20120309d2013|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBuilding business in post-communist Russia, eastern Europe, and Eurasia $ecollective goods, selective incentives, and predatory states /$fDinissa Duvanova, State University of New York, Buffalo 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2013. 215 $a1 online resource (xxiii, 251 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 08$a9781107454378 311 08$a1107454379 311 08$a9781107030169 311 08$a1107030161 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a1. Introduction -- 2. Collective action in adverse business environments -- 3. Postcommunist business representation in a comparative perspective -- 4. Business environment and business organization: the quantitative approach -- 5. What you do is what you are: business associations in action -- 6. Compulsory versus voluntary membership -- 7. Conclusions -- Appendices. 330 $aPrior to 1989, the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR lacked genuine employer and industry associations. After the collapse of communism, industry associations mushroomed throughout the region. Duvanova argues that abusive regulatory regimes discourage the formation of business associations and poor regulatory enforcement tends to encourage associational membership growth. Academic research often treats special interest groups as vehicles of protectionism and non-productive collusion. This book challenges this perspective with evidence of market-friendly activities by industry associations and their benign influence on patterns of public governance. Careful analysis of cross-national quantitative data spanning more than 25 countries, and qualitative examination of business associations in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Croatia, shows that postcommunist business associations function as substitutes for state and private mechanisms of economic governance. These arguments and empirical findings put the long-standing issues of economic regulations, public goods and collective action in a new theoretical perspective. 517 3 $aBuilding Business in Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe, & Eurasia 606 $aTrade associations$zRussia (Federation) 606 $aPressure groups$zRussia (Federation) 606 $aTrade associations$zEurope, Eastern 606 $aPressure groups$zEurope, Eastern 606 $aTrade associations$zEurasia 606 $aPressure groups$zEurasia 615 0$aTrade associations 615 0$aPressure groups 615 0$aTrade associations 615 0$aPressure groups 615 0$aTrade associations 615 0$aPressure groups 676 $a381.06/047 686 $aPOL023000$2bisacsh 700 $aDuvanova$b Dinissa$f1977-$0793354 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910953666703321 996 $aBuilding business in post-communist Russia, eastern Europe, and Eurasia$91779331 997 $aUNINA