LEADER 03853nam 2200613 a 450 001 9910953585803321 005 20250415183646.0 010 $a9786613232212 010 0 $a9780199790746 010 0 $a0199790744 010 $a9780190252540 010 $a0190252545 010 $a9780199911714 010 $a0199911711 010 $a9780199790654 010 $a0199790655 010 $a9781283232210 010 $a1283232219 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7036875 035 $a(CKB)24235075100041 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC746688 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL746688 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10492572 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL323221 035 $a(OCoLC)747409587 035 $a(EXLCZ)9924235075100041 100 $a20110401d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe rise and fall of Al-Qaeda /$fFawaz A. Gerges 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aOxford ;$aNew York $cOxford University Press$dc2011 215 $ax, 259 p 311 08$a9780199790654 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction : life after death -- The rise of Al-Qaeda -- The growing rift -- A success and a miscalculation -- Decline and fall -- Legacies and aftershocks -- Conclusion : down to size. 330 $aIn this concise and fascinating book, Fawaz A. Gerges argues that Al-Qaeda has degenerated into a fractured, marginal body kept alive largely by the self-serving anti-terrorist bureaucracy it helped to spawn. In The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, Gerges, a public intellectual known widely for his expertise on radical ideologies, including jihadism, argues that the Western powers have become mired in a "terrorism narrative," stemming from the mistaken belief that America is in danger of a devastating attack by a crippled al-Qaeda. To explain why al-Qaeda is no longer a threat, he provides a briskly written history of the organization, showing its emergence from the disintegrating local jihadist movements of the mid-1990s-not just the Afghan resistance of the 1980s, as many believe-in "a desperate effort to rescue a sinking ship by altering its course." During this period, Gerges interviewed many jihadis, gaining a first-hand view of the movement that bin Laden tried to reshape by internationalizing it. Gerges reveals that transnational jihad has attracted but a small minority within the Arab world and possesses no viable social and popular base. Furthermore, he shows that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were a major miscalculation--no "river" of fighters flooded from Arab countries to defend al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, as bin Laden expected. The democratic revolutions that swept the Middle East in early 2011 show that al-Qaeda today is a non-entity which exercises no influence over Arabs' political life.Gerges shows that there is a link between the new phenomenon of homegrown extremism in Western societies and the war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and that homegrown terror exposes the structural weakness, not strength, of bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Gerges concludes that the movement has splintered into feuding factions, neutralizing 330 8 $aitself more effectively than any Predator drone. Forceful, incisive, and written with extensive inside knowledge, this book will alter the debate on global terrorism. 606 $aTerrorism 606 $aTerrorism$xReligious aspects$xIslam 615 0$aTerrorism. 615 0$aTerrorism$xReligious aspects$xIslam. 676 $a363.325 700 $aGerges$b Fawaz A.$f1958-$0696510 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910953585803321 996 $aRise and fall of Al-Qaeda$91399396 997 $aUNINA