LEADER 03507nam 2200721 a 450 001 9910952277203321 005 20251117092358.0 010 $a9781283656535 010 $a1283656531 010 $a9780300183344 010 $a0300183348 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300183344 035 $a(CKB)2670000000275545 035 $a(EBL)3421064 035 $a(OCoLC)923601093 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000756232 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12265422 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000756232 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10750894 035 $a(PQKB)11578978 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000158014 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3421064 035 $a(DE-B1597)485857 035 $a(OCoLC)815823637 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300183344 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3421064 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10612155 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL396903 035 $a(Perlego)1089761 035 $z(OCoLC)815823637 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000275545 100 $a20120420d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe limits of de?tente $ethe United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1969-1973 /$fCraig Daigle 210 $aNew Haven $cYale University Press$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (442 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 08$a9780300167139 311 08$a030016713X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aFrom confrontation to negotiation, January-September 1969 -- The Rogers plan, October-December 1969 -- The first Soviet threat, January-May 1970 -- Crisis on the Suez, June-September 1970 -- Fighting for Sadat, October 1970-August 1971 -- The race to the summit, September 1971-May 1972 -- Bombshells and back channels, June 1972-February 1973 -- The contradictions of Leonid Brezhnev, March-October 1973 -- The crisis of de?tente, October 1973. 330 $aIn the first book-length analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Craig Daigle draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow.Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of détente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War détente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, Daigle shows, the United States and the Soviet Union fueled regional instability that ultimately undermined the prospects of a lasting peace agreement. Daigle further argues that as détente increased tensions between Arabs and Israelis, these tensions in turn negatively affected U.S.-Soviet relations. 606 $aCold War 606 $aArab-Israeli conflict 607 $aMiddle East$xForeign relations$zUnited States 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zMiddle East 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zSoviet Union 607 $aSoviet Union$xForeign relations$zUnited States 615 0$aCold War. 615 0$aArab-Israeli conflict. 676 $a956.04 700 $aDaigle$b Craig$0478713 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910952277203321 996 $aThe limits of de?tente$94353409 997 $aUNINA