LEADER 05059nam 2200661Ia 450 001 9910877993603321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-283-27415-9 010 $a1-4443-4388-2 010 $a9786613274151 010 $a1-4443-4391-2 010 $a1-4443-4389-0 035 $a(CKB)2550000001230121 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH21639521 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC819308 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4041672 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4041672 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11114475 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL327415 035 $a(OCoLC)761319838 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001230121 100 $a20110203d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 04$aThe admissible contents of experience /$fedited by Katherine Hawley and Fiona Macpherson 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aChichester, West Sussex ;$aMalden, MA $cWiley-Blackwell$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (200 p. ) $cill 225 1 $aPhilosophical Quarterly Special Issues ;$vv.2 300 $aOriginally published as Volume 59, Issue 236 of the Philosophical Quarterly. 311 $a1-4443-3335-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction (Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow). 1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne, University of Oxford). 2. Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven Butterfill, University of Warwick). 3. Experience And Content (Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 4. Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? (Tim Crane, University College London). 5. Conscious Reference (Alva Noe, University of California, Berkeley). 6. What Are The Contents Of Experiences? (Adam Pautz, University of Texas at Austin). 7. Aspect-Switching And Visual Phenomenal Character (Richard Price, University of Oxford). 8. The Visual Experience Of Causation (Susanna Siegel, Harvard University). 9. The Admissible Contents Of Visual Experience (Michael Tye, University of Texas at Austin). Index. 330 $aWhich objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. 330 $bWhich objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noe (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine's College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of Texas, Austin), Richard Price (All Souls College, Oxford) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard University) Essays address the central questions surrounding the content of perceptual experience Investigates how are we able to determine the admissible contents of experience Published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterly Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience? Although perceptual experiences frequently give rise to beliefs, the content of these beliefs do not always simply reflect the contents of the experiences on which they are based. Instead, they often rest on background knowledge and beliefs, as well as experience. This raises the question of how are we able to determine what the admissible contents of experience are, whether they include singular or existential contents, and whether they include contents pertaining to causation or natural kinds. The papers in this collection address these issues, together with questions concerning the nature of perceptual content. They deal with the central issues of whether perceptual content is similar to the content of the propositional attitudes; whether all states with content fall neatly into the categories of either belief or experience. The book also focuses on whether there exists a continuum from states that are more like perceptual experiences to states that are more like belief, and, indeed, ultimately whether we should consider perceptual experiences to have content at all. This ground-breaking volume is published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterl y. 410 0$aPhilosophical Quarterly Special Issues 606 $aExperience 606 $aPerception 606 $aEvidence 606 $aBelief and doubt 615 0$aExperience. 615 0$aPerception. 615 0$aEvidence. 615 0$aBelief and doubt. 676 $a128.4 686 $aPHI011000$2bisacsh 701 $aHawley$b Katherine$cDr.$01751180 701 $aMacpherson$b Fiona$01662536 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910877993603321 996 $aThe admissible contents of experience$94186039 997 $aUNINA