LEADER 05169nam 22006014a 450 001 9910841404103321 005 20230829004705.0 010 $a1-119-20581-6 010 $a1-280-36227-8 010 $a9786610362271 010 $a0-470-03281-2 035 $a(CKB)1000000000357307 035 $a(EBL)253841 035 $a(OCoLC)475966411 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000184380 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12011401 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000184380 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10204669 035 $a(PQKB)10831574 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC253841 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000357307 100 $a20051130d2006 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aIssues in monetary policy$b[electronic resource] $ethe relationship between money and the financial markets /$fedited by Kent Matthews, Philip Booth 210 $aChichester, England $cJohn Wiley$dc2006 215 $a1 online resource (212 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-470-01819-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIssues in Monetary Policy; Contents; List of Contributors; 1 Issues in Monetary Policy; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The monetarist counter-revolution; 1.3 Practice ahead of theory; 1.4 The dangers of practice without theory; References; 2 Monetary Policy: Practice Ahead of Theory; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 What can monetary policy do?; 2.3 Learning and its implication for monetary policy; 2.4 Inflation targeting as a framework which accommodates learning; 2.5 Conclusion; References; 3 Are the Structure and Responsibilities of the Bank of England Optimal and If Not, Does It Matter?; 3.1 Introduction 327 $a3.2 Current arrangements3.3 The conventional theoretical macro model (CTMM); 3.3.1 Role of interest rates in the CTMM; 3.3.2 Time series considerations; 3.4 How the Bank's main macro model constrained the monetary debate; 3.5 The new Bank of England quarterly model; 3.6 The monetarist case for a big central bank; 3.7 Lessons from Britain's monetary history; 3.8 Main conclusions; References; 4 Why Price-Level Targeting is better than Inflation Targeting; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 How do inflation targeting and price-level targeting differ?; 4.2.1 Long-term price stability 327 $a4.2.2 Short-term inflation volatility4.2.3 Output volatility; 4.3 What is there to gain from long-term price stability?; 4.4 Inflation volatility is not same thing as inflation uncertainty; 4.5 Price-level targeting generates its own credibility; 4.6 Price-level targeting is self-regulating; 4.7 Price-level targeting offers escape from a low-employment equilibrium; 4.8 The 'costs' of price-level targeting have corresponding benefits; 4.9 Price-level targeting vs. average inflation targeting; 4.10 The history of price-level targeting; 4.11 Conclusion; References 327 $a5 A Price Targeting Regime Compared to a Non Price Targeting Regime. Is Price Stability a Good Idea?5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The ultimate objective of economic policy; 5.3 Modeling economic shocks; 5.3.1 Assumptions of the model; 5.4 The model; 5.5 Determining Equilibrium; 5.6 A money demand shock; 5.7 Aggregate demand shock; 5.8 An aggregate supply shock; 5.9 The search for an indicator; 5.10 Conclusions; References; 6 Optimal Monetary Policy with Endogenous Contracts: Is there a Case for Price-Level Targeting and Money Supply Control?; 6.1 Introduction 327 $a6.2 Considerations in designing monetary policy arrangements6.3 Monetary policy: Is inflation targeting the best we can do?; 6.4 Interest rate control - what does it do?; 6.5 Money supply targeting and feedback rules - a stochastic simulation analysis; 6.5.1 Comparing money- and price-level targeting; 6.5.2 Should we use interest rates rather than the money supply as the short-term instrument of control?; 6.5.3 How important is the zero bound in setting the inflation target rate?; 6.6 Conclusions; Annex: The representative agent model (RAM); References 327 $a7 Forecasting Inflation: The Inflation 'Fan Charts' 330 $aSince the Bank of England was made independent in 1997, the conduct of monetary policy has been relatively uncontroversial. The debates between Keyneisans, monetarists and supporters of fixed exchange rate mechanisms now appear very distant. Despite the apparent consensus there are many issues related to the conduct of monetary policy that are not yet settled and which will soon come to the fore. Is the current form of independence for the Bank of England appropriate? Should a central bank target inflation or the prices level? How does a central bank deal with asset price deflation? Should m 606 $aMonetary policy 615 0$aMonetary policy. 676 $a332.46 676 $a339.5/3 701 $aMatthews$b Kent$0121753 701 $aBooth$b P$g(Philip),$f1964-$01730901 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910841404103321 996 $aIssues in monetary policy$94142773 997 $aUNINA