LEADER 03505oam 2200469I 450 001 9910835642003321 005 20220609202203.0 010 $a1-315-44395-3 010 $a1-315-44394-5 010 $a1-315-44396-1 024 7 $a10.4324/9781315443966 035 $a(CKB)4100000000774732 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4921898 035 $a(OCoLC)993977320 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7245460 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL7245460 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000000774732 100 $a20180706d2018 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 10$aRussia-EU Relations and the Common Neighborhood $eCoercion vs. Authority /$fIrina Busygina 210 1$aAbingdon, Oxon ;$aNew York :$cRoutledge,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource (242 pages) 225 1 $aPost-Soviet Politics 311 $a1-138-21546-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index. 327 $achapter Introduction: And yet another book -- chapter 1 Forms of power in international relations -- chapter 2 State- building in Russia and the choice for coercion in external relations -- chapter 3 Multilevel arrangements in EU external relations: Stimulating authority, constraining coercion -- chapter 4 Russia and the EU: From failed authority to mutual coercion -- chapter 5 Russia and the EU: No winners in the common neighborhood -- chapter 6 Belarus: Strangulation in a fraternal embrace -- chapter 7 Georgia: The story of one coercion and two authorities -- chapter 8 Ukraine: The ?battlefield? -- chapter 9 Turkey: not- so- terrible coercion, not- so- needed authority. 330 $a"Examining Russia-EU relations in terms of the forms and types of power tools they use, this book argues that the deteriorating relations between Russia and the EU lie in the deep differences in their preferences for the international status quo. These different approaches, combined with economic interdependence and geographic proximity, means both parties experience significant difficulties in shaping strategy and formulating agendas with regards to each other. The Russian leadership is well aware of the EU's "authority orientation" but fails to reliably predict foreign policy at the EU level, whilst the EU realizes Russia's "coercive orientation" in general, but cannot predict when and where coercive tools will be used next. Russia is gradually realizing the importance of authority, while the EU sees the necessity of coercion tools for coping with certain challenges. The learning process is ongoing but the basic distinction remains unchanged and so their approaches cannot be reconciled as long as both actors exist in their current form.Using a theoretical framework and case studies including Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, Busygina examines the possibilities and constraints that arise when the "power of authority" and the "power of coercion" interact with each other, and how this interaction affects third parties. "--Provided by publisher. 410 0$aPost-Soviet politics. 607 $aRussia (Federation)$xForeign relations 607 $aRussia (Federation)$xForeign relations$zEuropean Union countries 607 $aEuropean Union countries$xForeign relations$zRussia (Federation) 676 $a341.242/20947 700 $aBusygina$b Irina 801 0$bFlBoTFG 801 1$bFlBoTFG 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910835642003321 997 $aUNINA