LEADER 04198nam 2200685 450 001 9910829131603321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8014-7114-1 010 $a0-8014-7115-X 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801471155 035 $a(CKB)2560000000125893 035 $a(OCoLC)878834371 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10861879 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001196020 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11795965 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001196020 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11161130 035 $a(PQKB)10003355 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001510074 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138596 035 $a(OCoLC)1080550421 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58217 035 $a(DE-B1597)478331 035 $a(OCoLC)979590991 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801471155 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138596 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10861879 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL683623 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000125893 100 $a20140429h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe power of inaction $ebank bailouts in comparison /$fCornelia Woll 210 1$aIthaca, New York :$cCornell University Press,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (225 p.) 225 1 $aCornell Studies in Political Economy 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-322-52341-X 311 $a0-8014-5235-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tList of Figures and Tables -- $tList of Abbreviations -- $t1. Bailout Games -- $t2. Crisis Management across the World -- $t3. The Power of Collective Inaction -- $t4. From Theory to Practice -- $t5. The United States and the United Kingdom -- $t6. France and Germany -- $t7. Ireland and Denmark -- $t8. Lessons Learned -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tAppendix: List of Interviews -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aBank bailouts in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the Great Recession brought into sharp relief the power that the global financial sector holds over national politics, and provoked widespread public outrage. In The Power of Inaction, Cornelia Woll details the varying relationships between financial institutions and national governments by comparing national bank rescue schemes in the United States and Europe. Woll starts with a broad overview of bank bailouts in more than twenty countries. Using extensive interviews conducted with bankers, lawmakers, and other key players, she then examines three pairs of countries where similar outcomes might be expected: the United States and United Kingdom, France and Germany, Ireland and Denmark. She finds, however, substantial variation within these pairs. In some cases the financial sector is intimately involved in the design of bailout packages; elsewhere it chooses to remain at arm's length.Such differences are often ascribed to one of two conditions: either the state is strong and can impose terms, or the state is weak and corrupted by industry lobbying. Woll presents a third option, where the inaction of the financial sector critically shapes the design of bailout packages in favor of the industry. She demonstrates that financial institutions were most powerful in those settings where they could avoid a joint response and force national policymakers to deal with banks on a piecemeal basis. The power to remain collectively inactive, she argues, has had important consequences for bailout arrangements and ultimately affected how the public and private sectors have shared the cost burden of these massive policy decisions. 410 0$aCornell studies in political economy. 606 $aBank failures$xGovernment policy 606 $aBailouts (Government policy) 615 0$aBank failures$xGovernment policy. 615 0$aBailouts (Government policy) 676 $a332.1 700 $aWoll$b Cornelia$01650103 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910829131603321 996 $aThe power of inaction$93999272 997 $aUNINA