LEADER 03848nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910828557303321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4623-6989-8 010 $a1-4527-6116-7 010 $a1-282-84338-9 010 $a1-4518-7271-2 010 $a9786612843389 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055280 035 $a(EBL)1608322 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940826 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11519300 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940826 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10955497 035 $a(PQKB)10572487 035 $a(OCoLC)550640858 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009124 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608322 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055280 100 $a20041202d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFiscal incentive effects of the German equalization system /$fprepared by Sven Jari Stehn and Annalisa Fedelino 205 $a1st ed. 210 $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (31 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/124 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1700-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Discipline and Fiscal Transfers: A Difficult Nexus; Figures; 1. Subnational Shares in Total Spending and Revenue, 2006; 2. Comparative Composition of Subnational Revenue; A. Germany's Transfer System; 3. Net Contributing and Net Receiving La?nder; 4. Evolution of the Transfer System; B. Potential Implications of Transfers; 5. Debt by Government Level; 6: La?nder Debt; III. Framework, Methodology, and Data; A. The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint; B. Cyclicality; C. Data; IV. Empirical Analysis; Tables; 1. Germany: Descriptive Statistics, 1985-2007 327 $aA. Univariate Analysis: Fiscal Reaction Functions2. Fiscal Behavior of the Old La?nder, 1985-2007; 3. Behavior of Primary Expenditure for La?nder, 1985-2007; 4. Robustness Check I: Behavior of Primary Expenditure for La?nder, 1985-2007; B. Multivariate Analysis: VARs; 5. Robustness Check II: Behavior of Primary Expenditure; 7. La?nder Behavior and Average Received Transfers, 1985-2007; 8. Output Gap Shock; V. Policy Implications and Conclusions; 9. Primary Spending Shock; Appendix I; Appendix Table 6: Unit root tests; References 330 3 $aDoes reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in good times. Net-contributing Länder (paying into the transfer system), in contrast, have ensured fiscal sustainability through spending adjustments; they have also been less pro-cyclical. Panel vector auto-regressions confirm these findings. 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/124. 606 $aIntergovernmental fiscal relations$zGermany 606 $aFiscal policy$zGermany 615 0$aIntergovernmental fiscal relations 615 0$aFiscal policy 676 $a332.1/52 700 $aStehn$b Sven Jari$01610665 701 $aFedelino$b Annalisa$01603458 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910828557303321 996 $aFiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System$94117274 997 $aUNINA