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101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aBrute rationality $enormativity and human action /$fJoshua Gert
210   $aCambridge ;$aNew York $cCambridge$d2004
215   $a1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
225 1 $aCambridge studies in philosophy
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-03953-3 
311   $a0-521-83318-3 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 221-225) and index.
327   $aWhat would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality.
330   $aThis book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.
410  0$aCambridge studies in philosophy.
606   $aNormativity (Ethics)
606   $aDecision making$xMoral and ethical aspects
615  0$aNormativity (Ethics)
615  0$aDecision making$xMoral and ethical aspects.
676   $a128/.4
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996   $aBrute rationality$94007863
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