LEADER 03701nam 22005411 450 001 9910828161903321 005 20200514202323.0 010 $a1-5099-1276-2 010 $a1-5099-1273-8 024 7 $a10.5040/9781509912766 035 $a(CKB)3840000000340418 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5247398 035 $a(OCoLC)1008765394 035 $a(UtOrBLW)bpp09261638 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5247398 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11503232 035 $a(OCoLC)1021803814 035 $a(EXLCZ)993840000000340418 100 $a20180320d2018 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurun|---uuuua 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 12$aA critical account of Article 106(2) TFEU $egovernment failure in public service provision /$fJarleth M Burke 210 1$aOxford [UK] ;$aPortland, Oregon :$cHart Publishing,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource 225 0 $aHart studies in competition law ;$v18 311 $a1-5099-4022-7 311 $a1-5099-1275-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIn the general interest? -- The pathology of government failure -- The contestation and indeterminacy of Article 106(2) -- A most contingent exemption -- Government failure in assessing market feasibility -- Government failure in disapplication review -- Contours of a better exemption. 330 8 $aA Critical Account of Article 106(2) TFEU: Government Failure in Public Service Provision offers a sceptical perspective on how EU law applies to public services. Article 106(2) provides that other Treaty rules may be disapplied in order to sustain a Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI). The rhetorical presentation of Article 106(2) is as a strict exception. As a result, Article 106(2) is often presented as a threat to Europe's public service tradition. This book challenges those shibboleths by using the concept of government failure. It is concerned with instances of government intervention that are unnecessary, generate avoidable inefficiencies, or that can be bettered so as to realise general interest goals more efficaciously. As an element of the government failure critique, a market feasibility test incorporating the concept of market failure is used to expose laxity in the review of general interests under Article 106(2). Complementing that, the process of disapplying other Treaty rules under Article 106(2) is shown to have evolved from being strict to being highly indulgent of SGEI providers, with a relatively recent but only partial correction post Altmark. Overall, the strict exception label for Article 106(2) does not hold. Moreover, it is contingent and presents no legitimate general interest related threat to the organisation and delivery of public services. A comprehensive re-orientation of Article 106(2) on issues of proof is required, as is greater reliance on market counterfactuals, and much more careful separation of objectives and means in SGEI operation and design. Through these measures, the toleration of government failure can be stemmed and Article 106(2)'s contingency reduced 410 0$aHart Studies in Competition Law 606 $aRestraint of trade$zEuropean Union countries 606 $aTrade regulation$zEuropean Union countries 606 $2Competition law / Antitrust law 615 0$aRestraint of trade 615 0$aTrade regulation 676 $a343.2408 700 $aBurke$b Jarleth$01667647 801 0$bUtOrBLW 801 1$bUtOrBLW 801 2$bUkLoBP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910828161903321 996 $aA critical account of Article 106(2) TFEU$94027618 997 $aUNINA