LEADER 03801nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910827478603321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4623-3761-9 010 $a1-4527-0265-9 010 $a1-4518-7239-9 010 $a9786612843129 010 $a1-282-84312-5 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055245 035 $a(EBL)1608248 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000939936 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11518972 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000939936 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10946353 035 $a(PQKB)10894123 035 $a(OCoLC)586041473 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2009092 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608248 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055245 100 $a20041202d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe size of government and U.S.-European differences in economic performance /$fprepared by Gerwin Bell and Norikazu Tawara 205 $a1st ed. 210 $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (53 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/92 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1674-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; Tables; 1. GDP Level Accounting relative to the U.S; III. The Economic Effects of Government; A. The Base Case; B. The Welfare Effect of Government in International Perspective; Figures; 1. Key Parameters of the Baseline Model by Country, 1970-2001; C. Assessing the Fit of the Model; 2. Incremental Welfare Improvement for Different Tax Policies; D. Different Preference Structures; 3. Goodness of Fit over the Period 1970-99; IV. A Role for Efficiency-Enhancing Government; A. Frictions in the Labor Market; 4. Goodness of Fit of the Friction Model 327 $aB. Labor Market Frictions, Productivity, and Policy 2. Calibrated Vacancy Cost and Match Productivity (1990-99); 3. Bivariate Relations between Labor Market Policies and Efficiency; 5. OLS Regression of Labor Market Efficiency Indicators and Policies; V. Concluding Remarks; References; Appendices; I. Labor Supply in Balanced Growth Models; II. Analysis of Welfare Effects of Different Government Size; III. Introducing Risk Aversion and Capital; IV. Calibrating Labor Market Search Frictions for European Countries Using a Search Model 330 3 $aAn influential strand of recent research has claimed that large governments in European countries explain their weaker long-term economic performance compared to the U.S. On the other hand, despite these alleged costs, large governments have been popular with electorates. This paper seeks to shed light on this apparent inconsistency; it confirms an adverse effect of taxes on labor supply, but also finds evidence of efficiency-increasing government intervention. However, and especially in the core "Rhineland-model" European countries, actual government policies often depart from such efficient interventions, pointing to the possibility that voters prefer redistribution even at the cost of allocational efficiency. 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/92. 606 $aEconomic development$xPolitical aspects 606 $aEconomic stabilization$xEconometric models 615 0$aEconomic development$xPolitical aspects. 615 0$aEconomic stabilization$xEconometric models. 676 $a332.1 700 $aBell$b Gerwin$01681938 701 $aTawara$b Norikazu$01681939 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910827478603321 996 $aThe Size of Government and U.S.-European Differences in Economic Performance$94051689 997 $aUNINA