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035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2006064
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100   $a20061002d2006      uf         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aSovereign insurance and program design $ewhat is optimal for the sovereign? /$fprepared by Miguel Messmacher
205   $a1st ed.
210   $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund, IMF Institute$d2006
215   $a1 online resource (30 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/06/64
300   $a"March 2006."
311   $a1-4518-6324-1 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES""
330 3 $aThe design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; ii) the premium increases with the sovereign's incentive to take risks; iii) a deductible is chosen to limit moral hazard; iv) the deductible-to-support ratio is decreasing with the size of the realized shock; and v) the change in the choice of savings when insurance is available is ambiguous, as there is a trade-off between inducing higher effort and increasing the likelihood of default.
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/06/64.
606   $aInsurance$xEconometric models
606   $aMoral hazard$xEconometric models
606   $aInternational finance$xEconometric models
615  0$aInsurance$xEconometric models.
615  0$aMoral hazard$xEconometric models.
615  0$aInternational finance$xEconometric models.
700   $aMessmacher$b Miguel$01697144
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.
712 02$aIMF Institute.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910826876803321
996   $aSovereign Insurance and Program Design$94077616
997   $aUNINA