LEADER 03565nam 22006972 450 001 9910826818103321 005 20151005020621.0 010 $a1-107-14482-5 010 $a1-280-44948-9 010 $a0-511-18544-8 010 $a0-511-18461-1 010 $a0-511-18724-6 010 $a0-511-31341-1 010 $a0-511-61087-4 010 $a0-511-18631-2 035 $a(CKB)1000000000353713 035 $a(EBL)256658 035 $a(OCoLC)171138436 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000137389 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11151431 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000137389 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10088312 035 $a(PQKB)11692165 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511610875 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL256658 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10124737 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL44948 035 $a(OCoLC)80246606 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC256658 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000353713 100 $a20090910d2004|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aDesigning federalism $ea theory of self-sustainable federal institutions /$fMikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2004. 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 384 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-521-01648-7 311 $a0-521-81618-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 337-365) and indexes. 327 $aCover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Federations and the Theoretical Problem; 2 Federal Bargaining; 3 Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining; 4 Representation; 5 Incentives; 6 Political Parties in a Federal State; 7 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I; 8 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II; 9 Designing Federalism; References; Name Index; Subject Index 330 $aBecause of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements. 606 $aFederal government 606 $aComparative government 606 $aWorld politics$y1989- 615 0$aFederal government. 615 0$aComparative government. 615 0$aWorld politics 676 $a321.02/3 700 $aFilippov$b Mikhail$01615065 702 $aOrdeshook$b Peter C.$f1942- 702 $aShvetsova$b Olga$g(Olga Vitalievna), 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910826818103321 996 $aDesigning federalism$93945128 997 $aUNINA