LEADER 03384nam 2200625 a 450 001 9910826488903321 005 20230803030010.0 010 $a0-19-991473-7 035 $a(CKB)2670000000357800 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH25228591 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000886422 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12318058 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000886422 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10818031 035 $a(PQKB)11107341 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3055314 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000357800 100 $a20121213d2013 fy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aNaturalism and the first-person perspective /$fLynne Rudder Baker 210 $aNew York, NY $cOxford University Press$d[2013] 215 $a1 online resource (xxiv, 248 pages) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-19-991474-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 330 8 $aThis text investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; to formulate a non-Cartesian account of the first-person perspective; to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions.$bScience and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-personperspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account ofpersonal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality. 606 $aNaturalism 606 $aSelf (Philosophy) 606 $aPerspective (Philosophy) 606 $aPhilosophy$2ukslc 606 $aNaturalism 606 $aPhilosophy & Religion$2HILCC 606 $aPhilosophy$2HILCC 608 $aElectronic books.$2lcsh 615 0$aNaturalism. 615 0$aSelf (Philosophy) 615 0$aPerspective (Philosophy) 615 7$aPhilosophy. 615 0$aNaturalism 615 7$aPhilosophy & Religion 615 7$aPhilosophy 676 $a146 700 $aBaker$b Lynne Rudder$f1944-2017,$01718717 801 0$bStDuBDS 801 1$bStDuBDS 801 2$bStDuBDSZ 801 2$bUkPrAHLS 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910826488903321 996 $aNaturalism and the first-person perspective$94115877 997 $aUNINA