LEADER 03531nam  2200613Ia 450 
001 9910826450703321
005 20200520144314.0
010   $a1-4623-6284-2
010   $a1-4527-0366-3
010   $a9786612842511
010   $a1-4518-7176-7
010   $a1-282-84251-X
035   $a(CKB)3170000000055200
035   $a(EBL)1608170
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000943299
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11524017
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943299
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10994227
035   $a(PQKB)10731293
035   $a(OCoLC)694140992
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608170
035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2009029
035   $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055200
100   $a20100621d2009      uf         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 14$aThe cost of aggressive sovereign debt policies $ehow much is the private sector affected? /$fprepared by Christoph Trebesch
205   $a1st ed.
210   $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.$d2009
215   $a1 online resource (37 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/29
300   $a"February 2009."
311   $a1-4519-1612-4 
327   $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature; A. Debt Crises and Private Sector Access to Credit; B. The Role of Cooperation and Policy Signals; III. Econometric Methodology; A. Previous Approaches; B. Estimated Model; C. Dependent Variable: Foreign Credit to the Private Sector; D. Measuring Crisis Episodes; IV. Data: The Index of Coerciveness; A. Composition of the Index; B. Coding of the Index; V. Estimation Issues: Controlling for Shocks, Politics and Fundamentals; VI. Discussion of Results; A. Main Results; B. Effects of Individual Coercive Policies; C. Robustness Analysis
327   $aVII. Concluding RemarksTables; 1. Emerging Market Countries Included in the Estimations; 2. List of Control Variables; 3. Effect of Aggressive Debt Policies on Total Amount Borrowed; 4. Default Effects and Aggressive Debt Policies During Default; 5. Effect of Individual Coercive Actions (9 Sub-Indicators); 6. Robustness Tests; References
330 3 $aThis paper proposes a new empirical measure of cooperative versus conflictual crisis resolution following sovereign default and debt distress. The index of government coerciveness is presented as a proxy for excusable versus inexcusable default behaviour and used to evaluate the costs of default for the domestic private sector, in particular its access to international debt markets. Our findings indicate that unilateral, aggressive sovereign debt policies lead to a strong decline in corporate access to external finance (loans and bond issuance). We conclude that coercive government actions towards external creditors can have strong signalling effects with negative spillovers on domestic firms. "Good faith" debt renegotiations may be crucial to minimize the domestic costs of sovereign defaults.
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/29.
606   $aDebts, Public
606   $aFiscal policy
615  0$aDebts, Public.
615  0$aFiscal policy.
676   $a332
700   $aTrebesch$b Christoph$0873361
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bMonetary and Capital Markets Dept.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910826450703321
996   $aThe Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies$94083315
997   $aUNINA