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Collignon. 210 $aParis$cDunod$d1865 215 $aVIII, 138 p.$d23 cm 610 0 $aPonti metallici 676 $a624.3 700 1$aCollignon,$bEdouard$04426 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990000081320403321 952 $a13 AR 18 C 69$b3199$fFINBC 952 $a13 AR 21 B 69$b3863$fFINBC 959 $aFINBC 996 $aThéorie élémentaire des poutres droites$9109986 997 $aUNINA LEADER 00884nam0-22002771i-450- 001 990006316930403321 005 19980601 035 $a000631693 035 $aFED01000631693 035 $a(Aleph)000631693FED01 035 $a000631693 100 $a19980601d1950----km-y0itay50------ba 105 $a--------00-yy 200 1 $a<>imposta sulle successioni e l'imposta sull'asse globale ereditario netto$ecommento aggiornato a tutto il 18 settembre 1950$fCostantino De Bono. 210 $aMilano$cGiuffre'$d1950 215 $aXX,, 331 p.$d26 cm 676 $a336.2 700 1$aDe Bono,$bCostantino$0407376 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990006316930403321 952 $aXIV H 85$b31872$fFGBC 959 $aFGBC 996 $aImposta sulle successioni e l'imposta sull'asse globale ereditario netto$9655854 997 $aUNINA DB $aGIU01 LEADER 04429nam 22007452 450 001 9910826398303321 005 20231206203659.0 010 $a1-78138-713-3 010 $a1-78138-891-1 010 $a1-84631-772-X 035 $a(CKB)2670000000177958 035 $a(EBL)1591002 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000678349 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11414969 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000678349 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10699618 035 $a(PQKB)10855313 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781846317729 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000127173 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781781387139 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL867098 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10562062 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL877994 035 $a(OCoLC)793510856 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1591002 035 $a(OCoLC)867929479 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC867098 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000177958 100 $a20120528d2012|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$a'Merely for money'? $ebusiness culture in the British Atlantic, 1750-1815 /$fSheryllynne Haggerty$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aLiverpool :$cLiverpool University Press,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (xiv, 287 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aEighteenth-century worlds 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 02 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-78138-010-4 311 $a1-84631-817-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes. 327 $a1. Space, Place and People -- 2. Risk -- 3. Trust -- 4. Reputation -- 5. Obligation -- 6. Networks -- 7. Crises. 330 $aIn 1780 Richard Sheridan noted that merchants worked ‘merely for money’. However, rather than being a criticism, this was recognition of the important commercial role that merchants played in the British empire at this time. Of course, merchants desired and often made profits, but they were strictly bound by commonly-understood socio-cultural norms which formed a private-order institution of a robust business culture. In order to elucidate this business culture, this book examines the themes of risk, trust, reputation, obligation, networks and crises to demonstrate how contemporary merchants perceived and dealt with one another and managed their businesses. Merchants were able to take risks and build trust, but concerns about reputation and fulfilling obligations constrained economic opportunism. By relating these themes to an array of primary sources from ports around the British-Atlantic world, this book provides a more nuanced understanding of business culture during this period. A theme which runs throughout the book is the mercantile community as a whole and its relationship with the state. This was an important element in the British business culture of this period, although this relationship came under stress towards the end of period, forming a crisis in itself. This book argues that the business culture of the British-Atlantic mercantile community not only facilitated the conduct of day-to-day business, but also helped it to cope with short-term crises and long-term changes. This facilitated the success of the British-Atlantic economy even within the context of changing geo-politics and an under-institutionalised environment. Not working ‘merely for money’ was a successful business model. 410 0$aEighteenth-century worlds. 606 $aMerchants$zGreat Britain$xHistory$y18th century 606 $aMerchants$zGreat Britain$xHistory$y19th century 606 $aInternational trade$xHistory$y18th century 606 $aInternational trade$xHistory$y19th century 607 $aGreat Britain$xCommerce$zNorth Atlantic Region$xHistory$y18th century 607 $aGreat Britain$xCommerce$zNorth Atlantic Region$xHistory$y19th century 607 $aGreat Britain$xEconomic conditions$y18th century 607 $aGreat Britain$xEconomic conditions$y19th century 615 0$aMerchants$xHistory 615 0$aMerchants$xHistory 615 0$aInternational trade$xHistory 615 0$aInternational trade$xHistory 676 $a382.094109033 700 $aHaggerty$b Sheryllynne$01668826 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910826398303321 996 $aMerely for money'$94029689 997 $aUNINA