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100   $a20081009d2009      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurnn#---|u||u
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aFederations $ethe political dynamics of cooperation /$fChad Rector
210   $aIthaca $cCornell University Press$d2009
215   $a1 online resource (218 p.)
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311 0 $a0-8014-4736-4 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$tIntroduction --$t1. Cooperation and Commitment --$t2. Contrived Symmetry through International and Federal Institutions --$t3. Australia's Experiments with International Organization and Federation --$t4. Political Identity in Australia and New Zealand --$t5. Coercion and Union in Argentina and Germany --$t6. The Unraveling of East Africa and the Caribbean --$tConclusion --$tReferences --$tIndex
330   $aWhy would states ever give up their independence to join federations? While federation can provide more wealth or security than self-sufficiency, states can in principle get those benefits more easily by cooperating through international organizations such as alliances or customs unions. Chad Rector develops a new theory that states federate when their leaders expect benefits from closer military or economic cooperation but also expect that cooperation via an international organization would put some of the states in a vulnerable position, open to extortion from their erstwhile partners. The potentially vulnerable states hold out, refusing to join alliances or customs unions, and only agreeing to military and economic cooperation under a federal constitution. Rector examines several historical cases: the making of a federal Australia and the eventual exclusion of New Zealand from the union, the decisions made within Buenos Aires and Prussia to build Argentina and Germany largely through federal contracts rather than conquests, and the failures of post-independence unions in East Africa and the Caribbean.
606   $aConfederation of states
606   $aFederal government
606   $aInternational cooperation
606   $aInternational relations
615  0$aConfederation of states.
615  0$aFederal government.
615  0$aInternational cooperation.
615  0$aInternational relations.
676   $a320.4/049
686   $a89.39$2bcl
700   $aRector$b Chad$01692319
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801  1$bMiAaPQ
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906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910826364803321
996   $aFederations$94069315
997   $aUNINA