LEADER 03732nam 22007212 450 001 9910779920103321 005 20230808201103.0 010 $a1-107-12218-X 010 $a0-511-04726-6 010 $a0-511-17435-7 010 $a1-280-43302-7 010 $a0-511-15416-X 010 $a0-521-79323-8 010 $a0-511-32828-1 010 $a0-511-49110-7 035 $a(CKB)111056485622534 035 $a(EBL)201389 035 $a(OCoLC)475914742 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000136558 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11136101 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000136558 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10084006 035 $a(PQKB)10653063 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511491108 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC201389 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5292039 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL201389 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr5008034 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL436682 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5292039 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL43302 035 $a(OCoLC)1028954206 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111056485622534 100 $a20090302d2001|||| uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aDemocracy in divided societies $eelectoral engineering for conflict management /$fBenjamin Reilly 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2001. 215 $a1 online resource (xiii, 217 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aTheories of institutional design 311 0 $a0-521-79730-6 311 0 $a0-511-01695-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 194-214) and index. 327 $aIntroduction: democracy in divided societies -- The historical development of preferential voting -- Centripetal incentives and political engineering in Australia -- The rise and fall of centripetalism in Papua New Guinea -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 1: Fiji and Sri Lanka compared -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 2: Northern Ireland, Estonia and beyond -- Technical variations and the theory of preference voting -- Conclusion: assessing the evidence. 330 $aDemocracy is inherently difficult in societies divided along deep ethnic cleavages. Elections in such societies will often encourage 'centrifugal' politics which reward extremist ethnic appeals, zero-sum political behaviour and ethnic conflict, and which consequently often lead to the breakdown of democracy. Reilly examines the potential of 'electoral engineering' as a mechanism of conflict management in divided societies. He focuses on the little-known experience of a number of divided societies which have used preferential, vote-pooling electoral systems - such as Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Fiji. Examination of these cases shows that electoral systems which encourage bargaining between rival political actors, which promote the development of broad-based, aggregative political parties and which present campaigning politicians with incentives to attract votes from a range of ethnic groups can, under certain conditions, encourage the development of moderate, accommodatory political competition in divided societies. 410 0$aTheories of institutional design. 606 $aElections$vCase studies 606 $aConflict management$vCase studies 606 $aDemocracy$vCase studies 615 0$aElections 615 0$aConflict management 615 0$aDemocracy 676 $a324.6/3 700 $aReilly$b Ben$0558052 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910779920103321 996 $aDemocracy in divided societies$9931648 997 $aUNINA LEADER 03368nam 2200625 450 001 9910825754903321 005 20230803221051.0 010 $a1-4985-2562-8 010 $a0-7391-8605-1 035 $a(OCoLC)878078481 035 $a(CKB)2550000001251049 035 $a(EBL)1659891 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001131696 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12434076 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001131696 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11143856 035 $a(PQKB)11480619 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1659891 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1659891 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10854919 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL586060 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001251049 100 $a20140411h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu---unuuu 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAnalyzing strategic behavior in business and economics $ea game theory primer /$fThomas J. Webster 210 1$aLanham, Maryland ;$aPlymouth, England :$cLexington Books,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (287 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-7391-8604-3 311 $a1-306-54809-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aContents; Preface; CHAPTER ONE. Introduction to Game Theory; PART I. STATIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION; CHAPTER TWO. Coalition Games; CHAPTER THREE. Strategic Moves and Deterring Defection; CHAPTER FOUR. Competition Games; CHAPTER FIVE. Coordination Games; CHAPTER SIX. Infinitely-Repeated Games; CHAPTER SEVEN. Finitely-Repeated Games; CHAPTER EIGHT. Evolution Games; CHAPTER NINE. Tit-for-Tat; CHAPTER TEN. Mixing Pure Strategies; CHAPTER ELEVEN. Continuous Strategies; CHAPTER TWELVE. Static Oligopoly Games; CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Strategic Trade Policy 327 $aCHAPTER FOURTEEN. Product DifferentiationCHAPTER FIFTEEN. Strategic Complements; PART II. DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE AND PERFECT INFORMATION; CHAPTER SIXTEEN. Game Trees; CHAPTER SEVENTEEN. A Dynamic Oligopoly Game; CHAPTER EIGHTEEN. Bargaining; PART III. GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; CHAPTER NINETEEN. Decision Making and Uncertainty; CHAPTER TWENTY. Adverse Selection; CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE. Incentive Contracts; PART IV. GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION; CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO. Information Sets; CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE. Auctions; CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR. Signaling; CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE. Screening 327 $aAppendicesGlossary; References and Suggestions for Further Reading; Index; About the Author 330 $aThis innovative textbook is a concise and axiomatic introduction to the principles of game theory-the formal study of move and countermove. Undergraduate business and economics students with a background in the principles of microeconomics and college mathematics will find the material presented in this textbook focused, comprehensive, and accessible. 606 $aGame theory 606 $aDecision making 606 $aManagement 615 0$aGame theory. 615 0$aDecision making. 615 0$aManagement. 676 $a658.4/033 700 $aWebster$b Thomas J.$0873301 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910825754903321 996 $aAnalyzing strategic behavior in business and economics$94078041 997 $aUNINA