LEADER 03403nam 22006134a 450 001 9910825613403321 005 20240515174814.0 010 $a1-281-05230-2 010 $a9786611052300 010 $a0-08-047596-5 035 $a(CKB)1000000000363896 035 $a(EBL)293998 035 $a(OCoLC)213298431 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000107479 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11124960 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000107479 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10014081 035 $a(PQKB)11508603 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL293998 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10185970 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL105230 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC293998 035 $a(PPN)170246043 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000363896 100 $a20011130d2002 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAuction theory /$fVijay Krishna 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aSan Diego $cAcademic Press$dc2002 215 $a1 online resource (318 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-12-426297-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [289]-297) and index. 327 $aAuction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (""Linkage"") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object Auctions 327 $aChapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; Index 330 $aThrough accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.*The standard re 606 $aAuctions$xMathematical models 606 $aGame theory 615 0$aAuctions$xMathematical models. 615 0$aGame theory. 676 $a381.1701 676 $a381.1701 700 $aKrishna$b Vijay$0383824 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910825613403321 996 $aAuction theory$9263819 997 $aUNINA