LEADER 04429nam 22006015 450 001 9910825431403321 005 20230721022943.0 010 $a1-282-15810-4 010 $a9786612158100 010 $a1-4008-2978-X 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400829781 035 $a(CKB)1000000000804116 035 $a(EBL)457858 035 $a(OCoLC)432429091 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000336236 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11233722 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000336236 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10279149 035 $a(PQKB)10310433 035 $a(DE-B1597)446801 035 $a(OCoLC)979581680 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400829781 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC457858 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000804116 100 $a20190708d2008 fg 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|nu---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCorporate Governance $ePromises Kept, Promises Broken /$fJonathan R. Macey 205 $aCourse Book 210 1$aPrinceton, NJ :$cPrinceton University Press,$d[2008] 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (345 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-14802-3 327 $tFront matter --$tContent --$tPreface --$tIntroduction. Corporate Governance As Promise --$tChapter 1. The Goals Of Corporate Governance --$tChapter 2. Corporate Law And Corporate Governance --$tChapter 3. Institutions And Mechanisms Of Corporate Governance --$tChapter 4. Boards Of Directors --$tChapter 5. Case Studies On Boards Of Directors In Corporate Governance --$tChapter 6. Dissident Directors --$tChapter 7. Formal External Institutions Of Corporate Governance --$tChapter 8. The Market For Corporate Control --$tChapter 9. Initial Public Offerings And Private Placements --$tChapter 10. Governance By Litigation: Derivative Lawsuits --$tChapter 11. Accounting, Accounting Rules, And The Accounting Industry --$tChapter 12. Quirky Governance: Insider Trading, Short Selling, And Whistle-Blowing --$tChapter 13. Shareholder Voting --$tChapter 14. The Role Of Banks And Other Lenders In Corporate Governance --$tChapter 15. Hedge Funds And Private Equity --$tConclusion --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aEven in the wake of the biggest financial crash of the postwar era, the United States continues to rely on Securities and Exchange Commission oversight and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set tougher rules for boards, management, and public accounting firms to protect the interests of shareholders. Such reliance is badly misplaced. In Corporate Governance, Jonathan Macey argues that less government regulation--not more--is what's needed to ensure that managers of public companies keep their promises to investors. Macey tells how heightened government oversight has put a stranglehold on what is the best protection against malfeasance by self-serving management: the market itself. Corporate governance, he shows, is about keeping promises to shareholders; failure to do so results in diminished investor confidence, which leads to capital flight and other dire economic consequences. Macey explains the relationship between corporate governance and the various market and nonmarket institutions and mechanisms used to control public corporations; he discusses how nonmarket corporate governance devices such as boards and whistle-blowers are highly susceptible to being co-opted by management and are generally guided more by self-interest and personal greed than by investor interests. In contrast, market-driven mechanisms such as trading and takeovers represent more reliable solutions to the problem of corporate governance. Inefficient regulations are increasingly hampering these important and truly effective corporate controls. Macey examines a variety of possible means of corporate governance, including shareholder voting, hedge funds, and private equity funds. Corporate Governance reveals why the market is the best guardian of shareholder interests. 606 $aCorporate governance 606 $aCorporate governance 615 4$aCorporate governance. 615 0$aCorporate governance 676 $a343.7301 676 $a658.4/2 676 $a658.42 700 $aMacey$b Jonathan R.$0290839 801 0$bDE-B1597 801 1$bDE-B1597 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910825431403321 996 $aCorporate governance$9851281 997 $aUNINA